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Abstract
By some measures, the major U.S. political parties have become more extreme in their
political positions in recent decades, and scholars have raised concerns about whether the
policy expertise provided by today’s think tanks has become similarly partisan and
polarized. Furthermore, there is a perception that certain overtly partisan and highly
visible think tanks wield considerable and growing influence over the policy platforms of
the major U.S. parties, using their media presence to shape public and policymaker views
of particular issues. Using publicly accessible tax, media, and congressional data, my
proposed study assesses the extent to which media visibility and political partisanship
explain the degree of influence that modern think tanks have on policy outcomes. First, I
identify which think tanks are the most influential, as measured by interactions with
policymakers—namely, requests to testify at congressional committees (Abelson, 2002;
Rich & Weaver, 2000). I then use multiple regression analyses to assess to what extent
these measures of influence are associated with think-tank media exposure (as measured
by mentions in major news sources and social media metrics) and political partisanship,
adapting the methodologies of Rich and Weaver (2000) to measure the former and
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) to measure the latter.
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Introduction

In the ideal technocratic society, policy experts assess the merits and demerits of policies
and then advise policymakers while being insulated from partisan political considerations
(Kingdon, 2011; Lasswell, 1958). Among think tanks, which often provide such expertise,
this principle of nonpartisanship is the basis for the tax-exempt status of these
organizations. Recently, however, scholars have raised concerns about whether the policy
expertise provided by today’s think tanks has become partisan and polarized (Medvetz,
2012; Pautz, 2012; Peschek, 1987), particularly as the dominant policy shops have become
more reliant on foreign funding and wealthy individual donors. Furthermore, there is a
perception that certain overtly partisan think tanks, such as the conservative Heritage
Foundation and liberal Center for American Progress, wield considerable and growing
influence over the policy platforms of the major U.S. parties (Rich, 2004), even as a
smaller circle of think tanks are tapped for publicly-funded contract research, and policy
shops previously relied upon by Congress for their neutrality, like the Office of Technology
Assessment, have closed (Bimber, 1996).

Imagination may have the better part of the population when after 100 years of
proliferation pass, public comprehension of think tanks remains clouded. Hashemi and
Muller (2018) note that only half of American adults know what a think tank is or does,
and this rate increases to just 63 percent among “spectators” — those interested in
politics. In further analysis of “insiders” — those who work in politics, policy, or
government — 71 percent of insiders agree that think tanks serve the interest of the elite.
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At the same time 64 percent of insiders “trust in think tanks,” 28 percent of “spectators”
feel the same.

The ideological conflict among think tanks in the modern era parallels a broader
polarization of the country’s political climate. Polarization occurs when parties are “far
apart on policy issues, and the party members must be tightly clustered around the party
mean” (Poole & Rosenthal, 2011). Various measures of partisanship have found that the
two political parties have become increasingly polarized (Hacker & Pierson, 2016;
Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mann & Ornstein, 2012; for a dissenting view, see Lee, 2015).
For example, the government website govtrack.us (2018) calculates an ideology score for
all members of Congress, based on the number of bipartisan sponsorships over the
previous five years—the assumption being that Members of Congress with similar values
will cosponsor bills, and that those with dissimilar values will cosponsor different bills.
According to these data, there is only one Republican senator who stands to the left of the
most conservative Democrat; in the House, there are just three Democrats to the right of
the most liberal Republican. Utilizing a spatial model of voting records, another analysis
finds that roll call votes in Congress now show levels of party polarization not witnessed
since the Civil War (Hare & Poole, 2014).

Though both parties have exhibited a polarizing tendency urged on by wealthy backers
and political elites, some scholars argue that the Republicans show signs of a more radical
leap next to the drift of the Democrats (Mann & Ornstein, 2012). In the late 20th century,
anti-statist views came to dominate the Republican Party (Critchlow D. , 2007). The
Democratic Party, in turn, found itself more and more reliant on financial backers outside
6

of organized labor, including the financial services industry (Hacker & Pierson, 2010).
With the need to appease the financial sector and business interests, many Democratic
politicians rejected policies that hinted at redistribution or negatively affected the
autonomy of corporate managers, resulting in a working class without a party (Packer,
2008) and reducing the political landscape to an elite struggle between the “Brahmin left”
of intellectual elites and the “Merchant right” of business elites (Piketty, 2018).

The role of think tanks in this transitioning political economy is the overall focus of this
project, the transfer of evolving ideas into policy as attempted by think tanks. My
theoretical framework of policy making is built upon the work of John Kingdon and Peter
Temin. I will examine the agenda-setting capacity of think tanks from their role as
unofficial policy actors, particularly how they navigate the modern political and media
landscape to influence policy-makers. These four questions further lend clarity to the
scope of my study:
1. Which think tanks appear more frequently before congressional committees?
2. To what extent is a think tank’s media visibility associated with think tank authority as
measured by congressional appearances?
3. To what extent is a think tank’s degree of political partisanship associated with think
tank influence as measured by congressional appearances?
4. To what extent is a think tank’s degree of political partisanship associated with media
visibility measured by media references?
To provide context for this proposed project, I begin by outlining definitional complexities
in the think tank environment. Then, I present a brief historical assessment of the
changing political context affecting expert policy advising over the past century, a context
within which think tanks have, at times, prospered as a relatively unified interest group.
From early on, think tanks purported to provide value-free expertise based on technical
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rationality, a claim that has become more dubious as ideological consensus has waned.
Meanwhile, technological advancements in the media landscape have weakened the
dominant position of the general-interest mainstream media and have allowed for the
emergence of a multitude of more specific-interest and partisan outlets. This trend, I
propose, may be compelling think tanks to maintain high public visibility and cater to
more politically polarized audiences in order to remain relevant and influential. I end with
an overview of my proposed research methods.

The idea brokers
A think tank derives its name from warfare. Drawing from the metaphor of armored
transports, the term first referred to secure rooms where intelligence officers would
formulate military strategy (Smith J. A., 1991). This nomenclature was easily carried over
to strategic efforts on the political and social battlefield after World War II, when
policymakers took the view that societal problems could be solved if they dedicated
enough high-velocity brainpower to them. By the 1950s, government contract research
organizations like the RAND Corporation were being identified with this term, and a class
of idea brokers proliferated.

Medvetz (2012) considers the definition of think tanks a “murky object.” Scholars have
put forward a wide variety of understandings of what should or should not fall into this
organizational category. According to Stone (1996), these definitions range from the
inclusive to narrow. For example, Orlans (1972, p. 3) broadly describes think tanks as
“non-degree granting” institutions, which Weaver (1989), in turn, divides into three
categories: universities without students, contract researchers, and advocates. Medvetz
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(2012) describes think tanks as existing in a “hybrid interstitial field” linking business,
media, academic, and government worlds. Think tanks assemble relationships with actors
in each of these four organizational areas, he argues; the optimal position is in the center,
with proficiencies in all four corners. More narrowly, Abelson (2006, p.10) defines think
tanks as “independent, non-profit, tax-exempt organizations engaged in the study of
public policy.”

With this lack of consensus in mind, the definition of think tanks that I will use here
comes from Rich (2004, p.11), who describes them as “institutions that actively seek to
maximize public credibility and political access to make their expertise and ideas
influential in policy making.” This definition is well-suited to my study, given its focus on
think tanks with significant public outreach and influence in Congress, particularly during
the policy agenda-setting stage.

According to McGann’s 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index (GGTTI), there are 6,846
think tanks across the globe (McGann, 2018). (For his part, McGann (1995) avoids a strict
definition of think tanks, writing, “I know one when I see one.”) Most think tanks are
based in affluent countries and regions like Canada, the U.S., and Europe, within
knowledge-based economies. Of the 1,872 think tanks based in the U.S., a quarter are
situated within the sixty-four-mile beltway of DC alone, according to the GGTTI. Ninety
percent of US think tanks today were founded since 1950, and half since 1980. Most are
headed by males; one recent report claims just 7 of the top 50 think tanks in the US were
led by women (Manzano & Sanchez-Giménez, 2019). A Transparify (2014) analysis of the
top 21 U.S. think tanks—which includes think tanks with the most expenditures, assets,
9

and/or employees—found that in 2013 they collectively spent over $1 billion, had $2.65
billion in assets, and employed over 7,000 researchers domestically.
Aside from historiographies produced from within, academic study of think tanks has
largely been limited to a smattering of books by political scientists on think tanks:
Peschek (1987), Smith (1991), Ricci (1993), Stone (1996), Rich (2004), and Abelson
(2006). Compared to the voluminous literature on interest groups, the amount of
scholarly work on these organizations has been sparse. Rich (2004, p. 7) believes think
tanks have largely been ignored by scholars because of their low profile historically and
“the biases of social scientists, especially political scientists.” For much of the twentieth
century think tanks were seen as remaining above the fray of political conflict (Medvetz
2012). In general, their books and reports were meant neither to be marketing tools nor to
make headlines, but rather to “become infused” into the political dialogue (Rich, 2004).
Policymakers would use scholars’ research as one of the many tools in their belt, and
think tank scholars, ideally, would not publicly debate their research. This invisibility may
have contributed to a lack of academic inquiry into their operations. Another possible
reason for this neglect is that scholars tend to ignore how their own ideas get translated
into policy. As Hall (1989, p. 4) points out, “Any attempt to specify the conditions under
which ideas acquire political influence teeters on the brink of reductionism, while the
failure to make such an attempt leaves a large lacuna at the center of our understanding of
public policy.”

Scholarly study of think tanks is more important than ever. Claims of non-partisanship
have become more problematic for modern think tanks; even as certain elite think tanks
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have come to dominate the industry. The rise of new media platforms provides think
tanks with new means of influencing policymakers via their messaging, even as partisan
foundations and other funders have pushed their favored think tanks toward more
results-oriented approaches in their research. This proposed research study will help fill
in gaps in our knowledge of modern think tanks by examining understudied questions
about the intersection of think tank influence, media visibility, and political partisanship.

Bias in think-tank research
John Kingdon’s ([1984]/2011) work on policy agendas and policy alternatives provides a
useful way to understand how think tanks—in an ideal pluralistic democracy—exert their
influence on the policymaking process. According to Kingdon, how policy ideas are
articulated and whether they make the political agenda influence policymaking well
before any congressional vote. Within such a model, the “relatively hidden” expert plugs
away at their scholarly craft in the hope that a crisis or breakthrough opens a “policy
window” and inspires politicians to act on issues within their field. In this view,
intellectual expression takes on dichotomous forms, like naturalistic or normative, and
systematic or impressionistic. Political science is naturalistic, unlike the normative
political philosophy (Lasswell H. , 1958, p. 107); think tank analyses are, likewise,
concerned with political “conditions” and observations as opposed to “preferences.” And
normative expression is replete with terms like “should”, “good”, and “repulsive.”

Many think tanks claim their proposals are independently arrived at and based on
objective science. Domain names create some confusion as to the credibility of think tanks
such as .com (Peterson Institute), .net (New America), and .org (AEI, Heritage
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Foundation, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities), but also those attached to academia
like .edu (Brookings, Belfer Center at Harvard). They routinely use terms like
“nonpartisan” or “bipartisan” to describe themselves. Consider the current Twitter
taglines of leading think tanks: “Bipartisan institution founded in 1962, CSIS is the
World’s #1 defense and national security think tank” (Center for Strategic International
Studies); “independent research and analysis on the most important policy issues in the
world” (Brookings Institution); “private nonprofit nonpartisan research institution
devoted to studying international economic policy” (Peterson Institute). These selfdescriptions bring to mind the expert on the sideline, diligently and impartially
conducting their research on a social problem while they wait for a policy entrepreneur to
couple their empirical solution to a viable political platform.

This view, however, neglects the ways that expertise today has been weaponized to
support partisan agendas. Indeed, Kavanagh and Rich (2018) attribute the “decay of
truth” in modern times, in part, to the excessive partisanship of experts. While one study
found that Congress invited mostly neutral think tank experts to testify between 1993 and
1995 (Rich, 2001), some scholars argue that congressional testimonies nowadays are
dominated by ideological experts congenial to the agendas of the two major political
parties (Bartlett, 2012). Peschek (1987) describes think tanks as “private policy-planning
organizations” that should be viewed “not only as objective producers of research and
recommendations, but also as active agents linked to power blocs and policy currents.”
Stone (2013) highlights the difficulties that think tanks face in supporting principles of
academic freedom while being influenced by the biases of their donors; it is “no longer”
possible, Stone concludes, “to regard all think tanks as legally independent, scholarly-like,
12

autonomous free-thinking bodies.” According to this view, think tanks should be studied
as fundamentally politicized entities, comparable in their political aims and impacts to
explicitly partisan advocacy organizations such as the Koch Network or George Soros’
Open Society network (Fang & Surgey, 2018; Richardson, 2018).

More broadly, scholars have begun in recent years to rigorously question their own ability
to provide objective expertise. In 2016, the American Statistical Association released a
rare policy statement that essentially conceded that “the ‘scientific method’ of testing
hypotheses by statistical analysis stands on a flimsy foundation” (Wasserstein & Lazar,
2016, p. 129). In the influential journal Nature, researchers have spoken out about the
“limits of conventional statistics” (Nuzzo, 2014) and their concerns about the replicability
of scientific findings. The editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology have gone so far
as to ban the use of p-values in the articles they publish. “Change your statistical
philosophy and all-of-a-sudden different things become important,” says Stanford
physician and statistician Steve Goodman. “Then ‘laws’ handed down from God are no
longer handed down from God. They’re actually handed down to us by ourselves, through
the methodology we adopt ... The numbers are where the scientific discussion should
start, not end” (as cited in Nuzzo, 2014). In the social sciences, these problems of validity
are further complicated by the ability of the subjects of research to respond to that
research: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making,
the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1975).
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Of course, these concerns do not discredit social science entirely in the pursuit of truth,
but they raise questions about the ease with which such science can be exploited to
support particular political positions as predators, when principles are needed. Think
tanks subject to the pressures of the political landscape risk becoming more predatory in
order to attract donors or support prejudices, and more negligent from swift policy
windows, pressuring experts to rely on habits and heuristics in the media landscape. They
also make the self-presentation that many think tanks still adopt—the nonpartisan expert
assessing the given alternatives to empirically determine the most beneficial or least
costly policy—seem dangerously naive. That original belief in nonpartisanship, in turn,
may have been the outgrowth of a particular—and aberrant—historical moment in the
history of think tanks: the liberal consensus of the postwar period.

The liberal consensus
Broadly speaking, there are three eras of think tank history, according to Smith (1991): the
foundation era, government contract era, and advocacy era. The precursors to modern
think tanks were philanthropic foundations—what Medvetz calls “proto-think tanks”—
along the lines of Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford created in the first Gilded Age. During
the foundation era, captains of industry followed Carnegie’s “gospel of wealth,” charitably
supporting “progressive” — a slippery reference to science-based research and efficiency
— research from disinterested experts with the goal of solving social, political, and
economic issues (Smith J. A., 1991; Karl & Katz, 1987; Sealander, 1997). The “big three”
foundations (Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller) funded the establishment and operations of
various research and policy planning organizations whose explicit purpose was to serve
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the public interest (Parmar, 2002). Even then, though, ideological advocacy was the
norm, Slaughter and Silva (as cited in Karl & Katz, 1987) argue:

The foundations came to identify ideology manufacture as a major purpose
underlying resource deployment, and its production was joined to the pragmatic
solution of specific problems… Beyond production, foundations—through
professors and other professionals who claimed objectivity and value neutrality
in their practice and publications—marketed ideology that justified industrial
capital. Professionals were sought out to mediate the idea flow of corporate
capital to public in their role as experts, representing no constituency other than
science.

Within this political context of highly concentrated wealth and industry, “a belief in the
necessity, if not the desirability, of big business was one of the universal tenets of
American thought” (Kolko, 1977). According to a Hamiltonian view of the federal
government, bigness was the price to be paid for “maximum industrial efficiency,” and
monopoly was an inevitability in the political rationalization of business and industry.
Centralized industries led to the purposive centralization of federal power over the
economy, ultimately resulting in the development of a regime that Kolko calls “political
capitalism,” businesses’ use of “political outlets to attain conditions of stability,
predictability, and security” in the economy. The national debate over what form of
capitalism should prevail was ultimately settled by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose
administration’s Keynesian policies became dominant, and after World War II ideological
approaches deemed more radical—communism, socialism, fascism, anti-statism (at the
15

national level, not global; see Slobodian, 2018)—were largely shunted aside in favor of the
liberal democratic safety of the center-left (Bell, 1988; Lipset & Marks, 2000). What
followed was a thirty-year “great prosperity” of broadly shared economic growth for the
majority of American citizens, according to Robert Reich (founder of the liberal Economic
Policy Institute), which, in turn, cemented the liberal political consensus (Ferguson &
Rogers, 1986; Mann & Ornstein, 2012; Teles, 2008; Critchlow D. , 2007).

At the close of World War II, the federal government outsourced some of its wartime
operations to private experts, thus ushering in the government contract era of think tanks.
The RAND Corporation, for instance, was spun off in 1948 from the Douglas Aircraft
Company—better known today as Boeing—with additional seed funding from the Ford
Foundation (Smith B. L., 1968). Other think tanks founded in this era include the Hudson
Institute in 1961, the Institute for Policy Sciences in 1963, and the domestic-oriented
Urban Institute in 1968, as well as a group of think tanks focused on the dilemmas of the
Cold War—most notably, the Center for Strategic International Studies in 1962 and the
Atlantic Council in 1961.

Throughout the post-World War II period, there was broad agreement on society’s goals
and the manner through which they should be addressed. The consensus among business
and government leaders favored the economic doctrine of Keynesianism and a political
ethos of technocratic rationalism. The latter view—a belief that the modern scientific era
had brought about the end of ideology—further sidelined theoretical considerations in
favor of “decontextualized knowledge,” in which decision-making is, if not value-free, at
least value-neutral (Fischer, 2009). With these political winds behind them, a
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technostructure of experts steadily amassed power, leading one scholar to say “it is part of
the vanity of modern man that he can decide the character of his economic system”
(Galbraith, 1967, p. 396). During this time, “the big three” foundations provided
considerable support in building liberal knowledge networks and suppressing radical
ideologies (Berman, 1983; Parmar, 2002).

Of course, the consensus was not total. Prior to U.S. involvement in World War II, for
instance, the Brookings Institution—presently identified as neutral or left-of-center—was
a libertarian think tank in today’s parlance, advocating against any sort of welfare-state
policy as an undue cost on corporations and the rich (Peschek, 1987; Critchlow D. T.,
1985). The American Enterprise Association, though shunned by the big three
foundations for its anti-statism, also contested the liberal consensus, wrapping critique in
the form of question and analysis, for example: The Full Employment Bill: An Analysis,
Should State Unemployment Insurance Be Federalized?, and The National Health
Program Scheme: An Analysis of the Wagner-Murray Health Bill. That said, its
leadership implored its scholars to stick to “just the facts” in policy papers, recognizing
that the political climate of the time was hostile to anti-liberal economic prescriptions,
compelling AEA to add an air of the clandestine to the enterprise (Stahl, 2016).

The liberal consensus began to unravel in the 1970s, as wealthy donors began pushing a
form of “managerial conservatism” (Critchlow, 2007). To counter the dominant
Keynesian model, they developed an anti-statist agenda inspired by Frederick von
Hayek’s economic theories. Hayek’s work appealed to many businesspeople and wealthy
individuals, including Charles and David Koch, who began to finance a variety of
17

neoliberal organizations. For example, the Freedom School, founded by Robert Lefvre in
1957, saw the New Deal as a monumental mistake and promoted revisionist histories in
which robber barons figured as heroes; enamored with the organization, Charles Koch
became one of its executives and trustees (Mayer, 2016). Meanwhile, the American
corporate elite in general fractured considerably, particularly after the Powell Memo, from
the pragmatism and relative unity in the post-war years. Under duress, much of the
corporate elite shifted to conservatism, resulting in “a model of ineffectuality” at
addressing problems in society “since at least the 1980s” (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 285).

The emergence of a new neoliberal institutional infrastructure launched the so-called
advocacy age of think tanks (Mirowski, 2013). New corporate and foundation funding—
mainly from the Olin, Scaife, and Bradley foundations, in the beginning—allowed for the
establishment of both private think tanks and ideological “beachheads” at universities, to
ensure the “right” ideas were promoted (Mayer, 2016). These groups began to push a
growing list of conservative and free-market policies (Critchlow, 2007; Teles, 2008).
Warren Baroody, president of AEI, argued in 1971 that victory over the liberal consensus
could only be achieved by “assuring similar resources” to what the other side possessed.
AEI’s goal, he added, was to make sure “the American people are exposed to varying
points of view on public policy issues” so that “fair competition exists in the arena of idea
formation” (Stahl, 2016, p. 54). As these new conservative think tanks gained traction, the
established policy shops, wishing to maintain the appearance of being balanced and
neutral, increased their conservative personnel as well.
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Overall, the history of think tanks suggests that although they have always had ideological
agendas, for a time in the postwar period the salience of their partisan differences
diminished due to a liberal consensus shared by the major think tanks and funding
foundations. In recent years, however, the consensus has fractured—which appears to
have had consequences for political polarization among the country’s think tanks, in turn.
Such polarization may, then, be related to changes in the sources of funding that think
tanks regularly receive and, possibly related, changes in the approach that dominant think
tanks take toward their research on policy, creating feedback loops. I discuss each of these
trends in turn.

Changing revenue sources and tactics to policy
In a pluralistic democracy, mass-member organizations might fill the necessary role of
speaking for public interests on policy issues, but their influence has waned (McGoey,
2015). Likewise, fully publicly-funded think tanks—that is, government research
organizations—could conceivably provide less partisan analyses of issues (Blair, 2013),
but they have struggled in recent decades, partially as a result of the increasingly
corporate-supported Democratic Party drifting to the right, while Republicans have
embraced anti-statism (Hacker & Pierson, 2016). For example, congressional members,
staffers, and committees could once rely on four support offices: the Congressional
Budget Office, Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and
Office of Technology Assessment. All four of these public think tanks provided analysis on
interdisciplinary subject matter at the request of Congress, in addition to responding to
questions and concerns raised by the general public (Mosher, 1984). However, during the
Clinton administration, the federal government was downsized, falling as a percentage of
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GDP (Henderson, 2015). The 1995 budget bill gutted the OTA, even though the OTA’s
neutral approach had won bipartisan praise (Bimber, 1996). The size of the GAO’s staff,
which was 5,325 in 1992, dropped to 3,975 in 1997 (Bowsher, 1995). Today, conservatives
continue to question the need to fund government research organizations. Some
Republicans wish to dismantle the CRS, according to an insider from the Reagan and first
Bush administrations (Bartlett, 2012), and the Trump administration’s director of the
Office of Management and Budget, Mick Mulvaney, has stated that the time for the CBO
“has come and gone” (Cottle, 2017).

As for private think tanks, domestic foundations are now far from their only sources of
funding. Multinational corporations contribute heavily. For example, Liberty Mutual,
State Farm, United Health, and Bank of America are major donors to the Brookings
Institution and other think tanks, challenging these tax-exempt nonprofits’ claims about
being publicly-supported. This increasingly puts think tanks in the position of studying
aspects of public policy that their major donors have material interests in. At times,
controversies have arisen over perceived conflicts of interest. The leaders of prominent
think tanks have not done much to assuage such concerns. For example, after firing a
staffer known for being critical of the think tank’s donors, New America president and
CEO Anne-Marie Slaughter provided the following explanation (as cited in Cohen, 2018):
We’re an organization that develops relationships with funders. And you know,
these are not just black boxes; they’re people. Google is a person, the Ford
Foundation—these are people. . . . And particularly when they give you money,
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which is really a nice thing . . . basic courtesy I think requires—if you know
something really bad, you say, “Here’s a heads-up.”
Concerns have also been raised about the amount of foreign money that domestic think
tanks receive (Lipton, Confessore, & Williams, 2016; Silverstein & Williams, 2013). For
example, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Norway contributed more than $3.5
million to the Brookings Institution, according to their annual report in 2016, raising
questions about the motivations that these international donors have for funding U.S.
policy shops as well as the legitimacy of tax exemptions for organizations possibly
representing foreign interests.

These perceived conflicts of interest raise questions about which “public” foreign- and
corporate-supported think tanks are really seeking to aid (Freeland, 2012, p. 5). That said,
the more common concern raised about today’s think tanks is that they increasingly rely
on funding from foundations explicitly devoted to pushing the policy agendas of wealthy
individuals or families. From 1985-2001, nine of the wealthiest billionaire family
foundations—the Olin, Coors, Scaife, Smith Richardson, Bradley, Earhart, Mckenna, JM,
and Koch foundations—gave $1.7 billion in grants, of which $650 million went to a
conservative infrastructure of think tanks, elite journals, legal advocacy groups, and massmedia outlets (Stein, 2008). The focus of these foundations has arguably been on
achieving policy outcomes rather than encouraging any deliberative process of policy
review (Mayer, 2016; McGoey, 2015; Parmar, 2012). This has incentivized a new, more
proactive, and more aggressive approach toward think-tank research: using expertise to
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influence policy before congressional votes, rather than providing policy assessments after
the fact (Stahl, 2016).

Marketing research before a vote was not a common practice among think tanks until the
1970s, after the Heritage Foundation (seeded by the Scaife and Coors foundations) and
AEI (by now funded by the Earhart, Relm, Coors, Scaife, and Lilly foundations) pioneered
such tactics. As Warren Baroody, president of the AEI (then called the American
Enterprise Association), presciently wrote in 1959 to Harvey Peters: “Circumstances do
not make men; it is men who make circumstances” (Stahl, 2016, p. 32). In line with this
more results-oriented approach, insurgent think tanks like the Heritage Foundation
intentionally moved away from the traditional think tank model of the academic research
center. In-depth analysis by scholars was replaced by timely, concise policy briefs often
written by journalists, whose output would be held to a “briefcase test”—a report that
could fit easily into a congressmember’s briefcase and be read in the length of a cab ride
(Olasky, 2010; Rogalsky, 2007).

These new approaches have drawn from broader advances in understandings about how
to shape policy outcomes. In decision-making bodies, power takes on at least three levels,
or faces. The first face is simply the power to make decisions. It involves a transparent
dialogue and debate, followed by a decision made in a way that encourages trust (Dahl,
1957). The second face is about determining what policy options are even considered—
that is, the agenda. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) use Dahl’s (1961) Who Governs as an
example in which whole issues are left off the agenda, stating that Dahl “inquires not at all
into either the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor into
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their impact upon the public schools” (p. 951). In politics, policymakers often decide the
agenda items behind closed doors, excluding certain issues based on their own
preferences. The third face of power involves the bias of the system, which is maintained
by individual acts but also by the social structure and cultural pattern of behavior in
groups and institutions (Lukes, 1974). The second and third faces of power, for the most
part, operate out of the public eye.

The power to keep policies off the agenda can be more important than the decision to vote
for or against policy alternatives. Recent research in neuroscience has shown how nudges
and “framing”—how policy options are presented—can render human choices irrational
(De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). With this knowledge, political
entrepreneurs have developed new strategies to influence policy outcomes. Today, the
legal scholar Cass Sunstein (2017b) argues, choices by policymakers are molded by
“choice architects” — e.g. think tank experts — who provide them with educative “nudges”
in favor of certain policies; these discreet methods of influencing policymakers play,
Sunstein adds, “a large role in American initiatives.”

Of course, nudges toward particular agenda items do not necessarily have to be partisan;
in theory, experts can provide a clear understanding of a given problem and a careful
assessment of a policy’s merits based on solid objective evidence (Kavanagh & Rich,
2018). Expert judgment is increasingly helpful (Muller, 2018) as specialized knowledge
becomes more essential in understanding complex bureaucracies and processes (Weiss,
1992). At the same time, without equal access and sufficient political and economic
resources, educative nudges favor those who possess the substantial networks and
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resources that enable them to nudge harder than others (Proctor, 1991, p. 38). In this way,
policy agendas can be decisively shaped by the expert “alternatives” provided by wellresourced think tanks, which in turn hire only “elite” scholars with the “right” critiques.
This is the nightmare scenario for democracy that critics like Bachrach and Baratz (1962)
warn against. If the agenda is controlled by forces other than the typical voter, they argue,
then citizen influence over legislators is ultimately of little importance. The policies that
are given consideration by both parties will favor elite and interest group policy
preferences over those of the majority (Gilens & Page, 2014).

A related concern is that the think tank industry has itself come to be dominated by a
group of major players. It is true that with few barriers to entry into the think-tank
marketplace of ideas, the number of such organizations has grown dramatically, with over
1,800 think tanks in the U.S. alone. At the same time, the industry has become much
more consolidated. In 1995-6, a tally of the budgets of 200 nationally focused think tanks
came to a total of $523 million, or $876 million in 2018 dollars (Rich, 2004). In 2013, the
top ten think tanks showed expenditures totaling $780 million, or $853 million in 2018
dollars (Transparify, 2014). In other words, ten think tanks now have nearly the budget
that 200 did in 1995, indicating either the sheer growth or concentration within the
industry. In addition, research finds that think tanks that are geographically close to
politicians (that is, Washington-based) and “not part of the ‘liberal cluster’” (such as EPI,
IPS, and CBPP) have major advantages in obtaining funding from foundations,
corporations, and both foreign and domestic governments, the dominant financiers of
think tanks; according to Rich and Weaver (2000), “the budget of the entire ‘liberal
cluster’ of think tanks is slightly less than that of the Heritage Foundation alone” (p.99).
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Mediated experts in a backsliding democracy

In pursuing these results-oriented strategies, modern think tanks are also responding to
larger shifts in the political and media landscape. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt
(2018), the “guardrails of American democracy are weakening” due to the erosion of
democratic norms. Since the 1980s and particularly in the new century, Levitsky and
Ziblatt argue, the major parties have come to see their opponents less as legitimate rivals
and more as implacable enemies. Both parties now use whatever political control they
achieve to maximize partisan advantage, encouraging “fight to the death” and “scorched
earth” approaches to politics that are supposed to be the hallmarks of faltering or failed
states (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Buquicchio, 2017; Ash, 2017). As congressional norms
have deteriorated and partisanship has increased, a “vetocracy” has taken hold, with
political actors exploiting the system’s multiple veto points to stall the passage of any
undesired policies (Fukuyama, 2014).

Furthermore, developments in the structure of mass media have incentivized a more
partisan style among think tanks. Today, 93 percent of Americans get their news online,
and two-thirds of Americans use social media for news (Lynn, 2018). Sunstein (2017a)
has argued that with the advent of social media, a “daily me” is being concocted, as
citizens increasingly seek their news through platforms that allow them to control—and
thereby narrow—their choice of outlets to digest (though the choice here, too, is heavily
influenced, often unknowingly, by the platform’s algorithm). This “self-selection” problem
in media consumption is well-documented (Stroud, 2011). As a result, “general-interest
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intermediaries” that prevailed in the past, like ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcasts in national
news, have steadily given way to “specific-interest intermediaries” that heighten group
polarization. In social media, a lack of dissenting voices coupled with confirmation bias
produce “cybercascades” in which ideological convictions determine expert judgments on
questions of fact (Sunstein, 2017a). Partisan voices on cable networks like MSNBC and
Fox may still have significantly less viewership than their mainstream cousins, but they
receive significantly more discussion in print and other outlets for their extreme claims,
particularly high-profile conservatives like Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity (Taylor, 2017).
Such echo chambers prevent a shared foundation of mutual toleration and forbearance,
Levitsky and Ziblatt argue (2018).

This partisan media landscape has given result-oriented think tanks new channels
through which to promote their ideas to uncritical audiences, at times sacrificing more
rigorous analysis for negligent. Think tanks like the Center for American Progress cater
directly to journalists, as exemplified by title of the organization’s 2005 progress report:
“We Do The Research So Reporters Don’t Have To.” Heritage has created a radio studio
and Brookings has installed an $800,000 television studio (Medvetz, 2012). Journalistic
outreach includes newer technologies as well: from podcasts like Slate and New America’s
The Good Fight with Yascha Mounk to an array of Twitter accounts for each think tank
(Brookings, for instance, has handles specific to audience interests, like @BrookingsInst,
@BrookingsFP, @BrookingsEcon, @BrookingsGlobal, and @BrookingsGov).

Targeting partisan news outlets and using social media platforms provide think tanks with
at least two benefits. One is an indirect approach to influencing policymakers—
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influencing the views of the voters who decide whether they stay in office. Limited funding
and an explosion of information have forced think tanks to adapt in the face of
competition from “advocacy” groups for “the attention of busy policymakers and an
increasingly distracted public” (McGann, 2015). The agenda-setting function of mass
media not only tells the public “what to think about,” but “how to think about” it (Kim,
Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002). Politicians are particularly vulnerable to such media
lobbying; as McCombs (2004) notes, “there is considerable evidence that the shifting
salience of issues on the media agenda often are the basis for public opinion about the
overall performance in office of a public leader.” Another benefit of media engagement is
the connections it facilitates to potential investors, particularly elite investors looking for
“win-win” projects (Giridharadas, 2018).

Today’s journalists and think tank researchers share a symbiotic relationship, with each
benefitting from the other. Journalists seek out ideas and validation for their reporting
while scholars seek readership to increase name recognition and idea dissemination. That
said, the rise of social media platforms has meant that think tanks and their researchers
are also able nowadays to market their research and ideas by themselves (Shirky, 2008),
contributing to the ongoing decline of establishment news outlets, which have generally
had less success than their more partisan, niche counterparts in sustaining their
audiences over recent decades (Bagdikian, 2004).

In theory, fragmentation in the media landscape should democratize the provision of
policy advice by giving independent experts new outlets for their views. Indeed, some
scholars see the proliferation of “mom-and-pop” think tanks as a challenge to traditions of
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peer-reviewed scholarship in both universities and establishment think tanks (McGann,
2016). According to this perspective, universities and establishment think tanks are now
competing with more or less unaffiliated intellectual entrepreneurs to provide the public
and politicians with independent information and analysis in a pluralistic political
environment. The growing demand for specialized information has led to growth in the
supply of expertise (Bertelli & Wenger, 2009). On the other hand, greater competition
within the mass media may mean that resources, credibility, and recognition from
policymakers are all the more important in standing out among the multitude of voices.
Even if mom-and-pop policy shops can act quickly and make themselves useful to other
political actors, including social movements, they lack such advantages. Elite think tanks
have, for example, the resources to nurture national and global networks with other
NGOs, IGOs, and think tanks. In this view, it has become increasingly important to be a
member of an elite think tank in order to be influential.

While success is difficult to gauge, a strong presence in the media is indicative of a
thriving think tank operation. A study of interest groups by Cigler and Loomis (1995)
notes that think tanks purposefully seek to “greatly expand their visibility in the national
media.” Indeed, many think tanks include publications and appearances in major media
as a metric of their success in annual reports and other public statements (Rich, 2004).

In an eight-year survey of media citations and think tanks beginning in 1997, a trend is
unmistakable: there are more and more citations over time, in part, because generalinterest news wishes to provide two conflicting perspectives (Trimbath, 2005). With the
appearance of an even-handed debate, newspapers are able to claim indifference and,
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therefore, neutrality. The use of online platforms can allow think tanks to avoid relying on
the media as gatekeepers to public audiences; nevertheless, research by Johnson and
Kaye (2015) finds that the public deemed political news from major television networks
(excluding FOX) as more credible than social media outlets. Furthermore, among popular
rankings of Canadian think tanks, think tank visibility online does not correlate with
perceived reliability, suggesting that the use of new online marketing strategies may not
lead to increased influence or credibility (McNutt & Marchildon, 2009). On one hand,
some think tanks have the resources to execute a more thoughtful and sustained public
outreach component. On the other hand, many think tanks curtail such efforts to avoid
the appearance of impartiality.

Does media visibility translate into policy influence? Research by Rich and Weaver
(2000) and Rich (2004) finds that increased visibility is correlated with an increased
likelihood that a think tank’s personnel will be called to Congress to testify. Most citations
came from think tanks with no identifiable ideology (55%), while conservative think tanks
were cited nearly as often (39%) and liberal, the least (6%) (Rich, 2004). With regards to
congressional testimony from think tanks, however, conservative representatives
appeared twelve times more frequently than liberal, and those with no identifiable
ideology appeared ten times more frequently than liberal. The results of his analysis show
that conservative, market-oriented think tanks were the most successful at conveying
their ideas to Congress twenty years ago.

On the other hand, a study by Abelson (2006), which tracked U.S. congressional
testimonies from 2001-2006 in the Armed Services, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations
29

committees, found no significant relationship between high visibility in the mainstream
media and appearances before congressional committees—for example, the Senate
Committee on Armed Services during this time period relied more heavily on the CSIS
(49% of appearances) than on think tanks that were much more cited in the media, such
as AEI, RAND, and the Cato Institute. In another study, Abelson (2002) also found that
the most visible Canadian think tanks were not more likely to have consultations with
governmental departments. High media visibility is not a “precondition” to advising
senior public servants in departmental consultations, he concluded, but is strongly
correlated with parliamentary testimony.

Research problem

With the reduced government role in supporting public think tanks, those able to “help
government think” are increasingly private organizations that are located within the
beltway. These think tanks are vulnerable to conflicts of interest due to their sources of
funding, face pressures to market research in a partisan and results-oriented — rather
than enlightened debate toward social welfare — fashion, and focus on gaining public and
political attention through media visibility. This proposed study will assess how successful
think tanks have adapted to this new political economy. As Medvetz (2012) argues, think
tanks occupy an interstitial field of media, business, academic, and government spaces;
how exactly do the most influential think tanks navigate these spaces, and to what extent
are they more focused on their relationships with the mass media and partisan political
interests? Rich and Weaver (2000) and Abelson (2002) find that legislators, staffers, and
bureaucrats often point to the most visible think tanks in the media as the most
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influential, and their assessments of the direct influence through overall frequency of
congressional testimonies reinforce such claims. However, these studies were conducted
when the media landscape was dramatically different. Social media platforms like Twitter
and Facebook have transformed communication, and the media industry is still very
much in flux. With the advent of many-to-many communication provided by social media,
the established media gatekeepers are unable to filter the spread of populist ideas, both
the liberal (Occupy movement and Black Lives Matter) and the conservative (Tea party
movement and Trump). The resultant political partisanship in media contributes to the
lack of mutual toleration and forbearance in Congress. My contribution to the literature
aims to understand how these new media sources relate to think tanks visibility and
partisanship in main stream media, and whether this evolving landscape is translating to
influence in Congress.

I will use publicly accessible tax, media, and congressional data in my approach to study
the extent to which media visibility and political partisanship explain the degree of
influence modern think tanks have on policy outcomes. First, I identify which think tanks
have the most authority in Congress, as measured by interactions with policymakers—
namely, invitations to testify at congressional committees (Abelson, 2002; Rich &
Weaver, 2000). I then use multiple regression analysis to assess to what extent these
measures of influence are associated with think-tank media exposure (as measured by
mentions in major news sources and social media metrics) and political partisanship,
adapting the methodologies of Rich and Weaver (2000) to measure the former and
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) to measure the latter by converting DW-Nominate scores
from the 115th Congress.
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More specifically, I plan to determine which are the most frequent think tanks to appear
before congressional committees, the relationship of that authority to policy influence, the
extent to which media visibility is associated with congressional appearances as well as
with political partisanship, and finally the extent to which political partisanship is
associated with congressional appearances.

Ch 2: The Influence of Think Tanks: a movement in
expertise
This chapter will review the emergence of think tanks in the Foundation era through the
consensus period to their more recent explosive growth near the turn of the century.
With a scant handful of policy shops stumbling in the inter-war period, over 6000 think
tanks worldwide have been founded, more than half since 1980, and only fourteen
percent of the top 50 US think tanks are led by women. This boom in think tanks ushers
in the Advocacy era, distinguishing it from a time before intellectual bias was as visible
or on display in 24-hour news cycles and social media. However, neither in the
Foundation era nor Government contract era were think tanks advocacy-free or entirely
unbiased. Experts aimed at depoliticizing government, and the suppression of
widespread political bias in science aided the massive expansion of government. But it is
also true that tactics changed after the government contract era and elite intellectuals
struggled to reach consensus over basic aims, simultaneously blurring the line between
politically disinterested intellectuals and non-intellectuals (hired guns in intellectual
warfare) in a struggle over expertise. Divergent think tanks are logical outgrowths of the
reorientation of America’s elite (Ricci, 1993). The policies of think tanks take time to
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materialize and rise on the agenda, therefore it is important to understand their political
origins and how they attempt sway policy makers.

Political emergence and polarizing growth
From the first congressional investigation of foundations, criticism can be traced
throughout the remaining century from both the radical right, as vehicles for liberal
social policies, and the radical left that saw the “big three” as embodiment of the
establishment, but the important point to be made is that these institutions had complex
objectives from the beginning that are certainly not value-free (Berman, 1983; Parmar,
2012).

The great philanthropic foundations of the early 20th century were chartered with the
overt purpose to improve public welfare with eminent educators and publicly spirited
citizens. These “proto-think tanks” were of the social elite, and sought to build a
technocratic consensus through cooperating horizontally across other elites (Medvetz,
2012). The first Gilded Age is well known for its industrial monopolies and
unprecedented concentrations of wealth. However, Collier and Horowitz (1976) argue,
creating a “technology of power” is the long-lasting contribution of John D. Rockefeller,
organizing systems of networked power — an example is the creation of dynastic
corporate trusts. One scholar now argues “American law grants more rights to the dead
than any other country in the world” (Madoff, 2010). The proto-think tanks act as
another technology of power, shielded from taxes so long as they were adherent to
political neutrality and avoided propaganda. Such neutral claims are, however, belied by
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an ephemeral understanding of public policy (the Brookings-Brownlow feud is
illustrative).

At the same time, the first public research organizations were formalized with the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. With considerable outside support from director W.
Willoughby of the Institute for Governmental Research (a precursor to the Brookings
Institution) and a public desire to fix what Mosher (1984, pp. 16-20) calls a centralized,
duplicitous, and dictatorial federal financial system, the bill to make government more
efficient was signed by President Harding. The powers and responsibilities of the
General Accounting Office (now known as the Government Accountability Office) in the
Department of Treasury were transferred uniformly to a wholly new congressional
agency with the same name, and the Bureau of the Budget was created in the Executive
(now known as the Office of Management and Budget), both sharing similar goals of
“economy” and “efficiency” in government where extensive corruption and waste from
“political machines” was suspected. 1

Within a few decades, joining the foundations would be government’s strong hand at
addressing socio-economic problems, giving rise to the liberal consensus period of the
Government contract era (Smith J. A., 1991). As the post-war liberal consensus wanes
under elite conflict and the State endorses financialization of the economy, the liberal
consensus of the Government contract era is dismantled, in no small part by the

1

The GAO was “given independent powers for which it accounts only to the deity and most of which
it seldom exercises” (Mosher, 1984), in other words to the Comptroller, approved by Congress, for
fifteen years.
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advocacy and flourishing of new right wing think tanks, providing counterrevolutionary
ideas, simultaneously repoliticizing the seemingly “depoliticized” expert. In response to
the turbulent 1970s, the merchant elite organize around conservatism, funding a
movement spearheaded in new think tanks with new leaders and tactics to influence
policy makers and the public. This section explains how think tanks emerged as political
objects while some have grown into commodified, ascientific, and manipulative
propaganda.

Private wealth and social discontents
Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth gave purpose to the boundless resources few but
the robber barons possessed (Josephson, 1934). Carnegie thought it immoral to die with
such surplus and it should be directed toward the betterment of one’s community and
more, that estate taxes were necessary, indeed, the “wisest” of taxes. His own directive
for charity included universities, medical institutions, public parks, concert halls,
churches, and more than 3,000 libraries (Madoff, 2010). The efforts of Rockefeller
Foundation (1913) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP/1910), to
some, like Ida Tarbell and Henry Demarest Lloyd, were little more than alms for the
poor in an attempt to rebrand themselves for their exploitation of labor. What can be
said is that the blend of noble efforts, a robber baron’s drive for success yet directed at
assuaging the ills of robber baron society, succeeded in sustaining private wealth and its
social discontents, shaping the treatments to those problems in ways that stray from
threatening the very system that produces them (McGoey, 2015; Parmar, 2012). The
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Commission on Industrial Relations otherwise known as the Walsh Commission of 1916
is helpful in understanding these origins.

Samuel Untermeyer, best known as lead counsel in the Pujo Commission to investigate
the “money trust” of the House of Morgan, discusses the formation of the Rockefeller
Foundation’s Charter after its unfulfilled application in Washington D.C. to Congress.
The New York State legislature, which granted the charter, was not overly important, “if
New York had not given them what they wanted they would have passed along from
State to State until they found a corporate habitation on their own terms, without in the
least interfering with their operating wherever they chose. This ought not to be
possible.” However, foundations were not without their incredible strengths according
to Untermeyer, and had potential for tremendous good only if structured differently,
namely denied “perpetual charters,” “be limited in size” and “not be permitted to
accumulate income” (Walsh, 1916).

Basil Manly, director of research for the Walsh Commission, lamented the concentration
of tax-free resources controlled by few hands in America’s Gilded Age:

The funds of these foundations are exempt from taxation, yet during the life of
their founders are subject to their dictation for any purpose other than
commercial profit. In the case of the Rockefeller group of foundations, the
absolute control of the funds and of the activities of the institutions now and in
perpetuity rests with Mr. Rockefeller, his son, and whomsoever they may
appoint as their successors. The control of these funds has been widely published
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as being in the hands of eminent educators and publicly spirited citizens. In the
case of the Rockefeller foundations, however, the majority of the trustees are
salaried employees of Mr. Rockefeller or the foundations, who are subject to
personal dictation and may be removed at any moment.

At the christening of the Rockefeller Foundation, “Universality and Deathlessness” are
the opening words spoken by Frederick T. Gates, Rockefeller’s chief philanthropic
advisor, proclaiming the limits to the foundation’s interests have been removed
(Fosdick, 1952). The prophecy to last in perpetuity free from public oversight is
validated by today’s presence of the big three (Ford was reluctant at first). However, it is
Gates’ twin concepts of “universality and deathlessness” that Louis Brandeis, a
prominent corporate lawyer, professor, and justice of the Supreme Court, seems to have
in mind when he compared large foundations to their relationship with corporate power
and the forces they command “from all parts of the country”, forces which can be used
“in any conflict to carry out what they deem to be their business principle, and can also
afford to suffer losses.” Brandeis is prescient and worth quoting at length (Walsh, 1916):

The result in the cases of these large corporations, may be to develop a
benevolent absolutism, but it is an absolutism all the same; and it is that which
makes the great corporation so dangerous. There develops within the State a
state so powerful that the ordinary social and industrial forces existing are
insufficient to cope with it.
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Against such claims, Rockefeller reminds the committee during one of his days bearing
witness that “these foundations, as is true of all modern corporations, are subject to the
reserved power of legislative bodies which created them—to modify and appeal their
charters whenever the public interests require.” But Rockefeller was clear on another; he
wished for voluntary, not mandatory, fiscal reports to government, preferring no
interference at all.

The Walsh Commission resolved in disagreement, given the purposefully conflicted
makeup of its personnel—joint representatives from labor and business—and appended
supplemental reports to the main document by director Manly. The report, nevertheless,
concluded “it would be desirable to recommend their abolition.” Otherwise, these
institutions required government oversight and investigation, transparency, limited
funds, caps on accumulation, and a final requirement for Government’s own investment
in education and social programs. Without competition, he asserted, the dominant men
of industry “rapidly extended to control the education and ‘social service’ of the nation”
(Walsh, 1916, p. 81). Commons and Harriman, commissioners from the business sector,
recommended to delay action, continue investigation by Congress, and, importantly,
there should be no subsidization by government to foundations nor foundations to
governments in their supplemental report. Government should consider foundations as
competitors. In this view, foundations are considered (nearly) equal institutions with
concentrated wealth, charitably directed to whatever cause in perpetuity.

At the heart of the burgeoning think tank industry are the neutral claims of eminent
educators and publicly spirited citizens. The tax-exempt status forbids them from
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supporting political causes or engaging in propaganda. However, clear objectives with
political implications can be made out from the beginning: a state charter to address any
and all projects in the name of welfare while free from taxation and public oversight, the
ability to profit, and exist in perpetuity at an unlimited size. The Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, for example, ran right up to the line of political activity early,
attracting attention from Congress when it published and disseminated 700,000 copies
of an article written by Elihu Root, president of CEIP and Sen. of New York, on
eliminating an exemption for American vessels paying the taxes to foreign countries for
use of the Panama canal, prompting one senator to ask of the CEIP secretary in front of
the Senate Lobby Committee, “what has it [a peace organization] to do with Panama
Canal tolls?” No legal actions were taken potentially regarding CEIP as a lobby
(Medvetz, 2012).

It was the belief that a national government, like nationalized industries, could benefit
from the tools and resources that made war and industry successful. Congress needed
such technocratic assistance and the War Industries Board embodied it. Afterwards, a
standing think tank for business and war planning was formed by leaders of finance and
industry, the Council on Foreign Relations (1921) (Shoup & Minter, 1977). And there
were other proto-think tanks like the National Bureau for Economic Research (1920)
and the Twentieth Century Fund (1919) which is now The Century Foundation, but it
would not be until the Great Depression that the government would try its hand
addressing wide-spread societal issues. By then, government largely followed the
systems designed, tested, and promoted by private philanthropy. According to Karl
(1976, p. 132) “private philanthropy was not competing with a publicly supported
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federal system. It was, however, providing a method of social planning, and it would be
sixty years before the federal government would move into active, overwhelming
competition.” The competition called for by Commons and Harriman in the Walsh
investigation would be late-coming.

Brookings v. Brownlow
Taylorism was expanding from its success in business to social planning, and likewise
technocratic solutions were sought for social projects, including making government
more ‘efficient.’ After successful central planning in the War Industries Board, Robert S.
Brookings was adamant that much more could be done with scientific observation and
economic planning. Thus, he led fundraising efforts for the Institute for Governmental
Research in 1916 (IGR), the Institute of Economics in 1922, and a Graduate School in
1922 which would all merge as one and absolve the school, becoming Brookings
Institution in 1927 (Critchlow D. T., 1985). The historian Alasdair Roberts (1995)
provides an exceptional account of the “Brownlow-Brookings Feud” in the late 1930s
over government reorganization in which Louis Brownlow states “the reputation of
government research… for scientific impartiality is at stake.” The academics were careful
not to overly politicize the reorganization task, even if conflict could not be avoided as
the Rockefeller Foundation had hoped.

During a second major economic recession, FDR attempted to restructure the executive
office — as well as the Supreme Court — in order to circumnavigate conservative
opposition. This led to his creation of the Brownlow Commission, after advisement in
the form of a letter from Charles Merriam. The Commission would be comprised of
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experts Luther Gulick, Charles Merriam, and Louis Brownlow, who were tasked with
developing their own ideas on the reorganization of government, to which they largely
agreed a strong executive branch should lead a nation-sized public administration (Fry
& Raadschedlers, 2008). But reorganization had been central to Brookings from its
birth. Indeed, the IGR — a precursor to Brookings — ushered in the Bureau of the
Budget in 1921, guiding policy makers through its passage and sharing office space with
the new organization until accommodations could be acquired. Sen. Harry Byrd, a
conservative Democrat from Virginia and chair of the Select Committee on Government
Organization, tapped Brookings with a $20,000 proposition to develop their plan for
reorganization in tandem, to which Harold Moulton, president of Brookings, felt it a
metaphysical “moral obligation” to accept (Critchlow D. T., 1985). Moulton, known for
his dismal take on the New Deal, aligned Brookings with anti-statist business interests
and conservatives.

Sen. Byrd’s Select Committee was overtly concerned about changes in the executive that
might create redundancies or conflict with other agencies and whether or not they be
abolished or better coordinated. Covertly, the concern was with the strengthening of
executive power. Over time, the Brookings charge would divulge from the appropriate
method of reorganization to “question as to whether or not the President be given all or
any part of the powers his committee recommended” (Select Committee on Government
Organization, 1937). However, the underlying concern from all three parties was that
the burgeoning new crop of public administrators would be threatened by a public fight,
undermining the façade of neutrality and likewise the forming public administration
community itself (Roberts, 1995).
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The pending bout alarmed intellectuals and the claim that a technocratic solution to
government organization could not be disagreed upon. A depoliticized technocrat would
reach the right solution, provided the purpose was the same. This fear in the 1930s
could not be understated, according to Roberts (1995). Recall the Friedrich-Finer debate
of the late-depression era in academia, for example, pitting the propriety of
“responsibility” versus “accountability” among public administrators in a democratic
society (Jackson, 2009; Plant, 2011).

An important difference from the Friedrich-Finer debate is that Brookings and
Brownlow kept much of their correspondence and data confidential for fear of stoking a
political fire in the media and simultaneously undermining their efforts to depoliticize a
public administration. Moreover, in a meeting with Sen. Byrd, representatives from
Brookings and Louis Brownlow agreed to limit “ourselves rigidly to avoid the field of
policy.” In another meeting it was suggested that Brookings go so far as follow
Brownlow’s findings regarding fiscal administration; they declined. After Brookings
learned of the Administrative preliminary report to place more of the budget under the
executive branch, their cooperation ended. Drafts of reports to Brookings were stopped
after it was believed Congress was getting copies and leaking them to press, weeks ahead
of the 1936 election. Upon attempts to reconcile, division further ensued leading
Moulton to call Brownlow’s proposal “non-American”, without yet seeing the report.
Brownlow would schedule the final report to be completed after the election to avoid the
agenda setting effect it would have. Moreover, Rockefeller was preparing to mediate the
debate between the groups in secrecy in order to avoid the appearance of political
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activity in any of its recipient organizations, like Brookings, the Social Science Research
Council (Brownlow and Merriam), and the Institute of Public Administration (Gulick).
In this instance, transparency was avoided in order to shield the public from the
politicized and epistemological nature of public administration, in paradoxical hopes of
sustaining reverence to experts without “open, reasoned divergence on matters of public
importance”, creating an asymmetry of information between the public and publiclyspirited citizens.

The conclusions that Brookings had made put the Board in a bind, not only because the
loss of Robert S. Brookings created a vacancy that was filled by none other than Frederic
Delano, uncle to the President, but also its clear opposition to the President’s committee
gave fuel to Roosevelt’s Republican opponents and the media, like the Hearst press
machine which labelled the proposition the “dictator bill.” As “embarrassing” as it was
to be chairman of an institution victimized from media onslaught, Delano resigned,
stating “it is impossible to expect an institution which has to raise funds to be liberal”
(as cited in Critchlow, 1985, p.135). In addition, Moulton accused Delano of assisting
their rivals in the Brownlow Commission. The Board would support Moulton and his
continued rhetoric to party indifference and Delano would be replaced quickly with
Dwight F. Davis, President Harding’s secretary of War. Brookings’ report may have been
adversarial but it is not the sole reason some of Brownlow’s proposals failed. Some were
successful. Acting Director of the BoB in 1938, Daniel Bell, recommended realignment
of the executive office following the Brownlow report, to which his successor in 1939
would implement (Mosher, 1984). And Brookings would also continue to post anti-
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Roosevelt members to the board, including a young Dean Acheson, Roosevelt’s first
undersecretary to the Treasury that was forced to resign over policy opposition.

Brookings became alienated from the charitable trusts. The foundations wished to
support organizations that contributed to government, and Brookings support was
“negligible.” In 1942, the operating expenses fell by nearly a third from the previous year
to $312,000 (Saunders, 1966). Moulton’s continued disbelief in Keynesian economics,
however, would find some support from businessmen and conservative economists.
Edwin Gay, dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Business would aid Moulton, for
example, as well as letters from “bankers, stockbrokers, engineers, and corporate
executives” offering support to “keep up the fight” (Critchlow D. T., 1985, p. 141).

Other partisan positions would follow at Brookings, including general opposition of New
Deal policies, Sen. Wagner’s Full Employment Act (which they considered totalitarian
and a gateway to the end of private enterprise), and Truman’s Fair Deal attempt at
universal health care. Any of these economic bills would increase the federal
government and its bureaucratic capacity as well as potential distance from a balanced
budget. Albeit, Truman’s generous slash of the budget from $91 billion in the first
quarter of 1945 to $24.5 billion by mid-1947 belies such claims against balancing.
Meanwhile, policies that increased subsidization for military expenditures would not
merit the same cost-benefit conclusions as the Cold War approached. A bombs-not-jobs
approach could be claimed as Brookings’ reports began to advocate reducing
expenditures when applied to social programs and endorsed those in matters of war.
Moulton went so far as to write Thomas Dewey, presidential rival to Truman,
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recommending General MacArthur to the rebranded cabinet post of Secretary of
Defense though he admittedly did not know the general personally but “the dictatorial
qualities ascribed to him would be assets in this particular situation” (Critchlow D. T.,
1985, p. 163). Moulton was fully aware of his obvious trespass onto partisan politics
involving himself in Dewey’s campaign but as to why could only be guessed at, Critchlow
suspects mounting anxiety of an impending military defeat. With Moulton’s retirement,
Brookings financial status is resurrected when, former director of the General Education
Fund for the Rockefeller Foundation, Robert Calkins becomes president in 1952,
bringing the name of Brookings into the fold of the liberal consensus.

In an optimistic view, the eagerness to display a disinterested and detached expert
greased the wheels of the public ability to accept a growing federal government that
could meet the needs of national problems. In a more critical view, the need for a
disinterested expert was defensive, believing the public incapable of settling with the
ubiquity of politics. Even the Rockefeller Foundation became alert to the BrownlowBrookings feud though it had no interest in either report concerning the GAO;
Rockefeller Foundations did however contribute to think tanks and a crack in the
veneration of disinterested policy experts might understandably spread upward to the
proto-think tanks themselves. In retrospect, Roberts argues, the disagreements
amounted to responsible differences concerning the New Deal through discussions
around terms like “efficiency” and “scientific principle.”

From their inception in the foundation era, think tanks were highly aware of the
politicized nature of technocratic solutions and their “demonstration of neutrality.”
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Brookings clearly was party to and part of debates concerning the proper role of experts
in policy making and, at times, genuinely attempting to help government think. The
upcoming war would force government’s hand if it was to compete with Germany. In
1940, the U.S. government spent less than $100 million on research and development,
mostly on agriculture and military projects (Smith J. A., 1991). By 1945, however,
government investment reached $1.5 billion, and economists began to portend that the
resolution of the war would risk a return to economic slippage. Thus, a new research
organization was created, the Committee of Economic Development (CED) with a hope
of maintaining low unemployment through continued government assistance. Alongside
the influential CED, government investment in think tanks brought about the RAND
Corporation in 1946, the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 1955, the Atlantic Council
in 1961, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1962, and the Urban
Institute in 1968.

Dismantling the consensus through crises
Experts wishing to avoid the liberal consensus, feeling shunned by the intellectual elites,
often crossed the Atlantic (Mirowski, 2013). The Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS/1947),
founded by members of the International Chamber of Commerce and Frederick Hayek,
served as a retreat for academics quite literally and fostered what would later be an
important intellectual outlet for market fundamentalism. In Switzerland, the Geneva
school of neoliberal economics founded economic theory in support of international
economic law, a global economic infrastructure (Slobodian, 2018).
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Others were tapped to redefine the vital center as a safe alternative to the far-right and
left wings of the political spectrum. Hofstadter, for example, was contracted by the
Twentieth Century Fund (TCF), a think tank led by Adolf Berle, and the Ford
Foundation to convince Americans slowly that the robber barons had never existed.
Rather, the populists against monopoly power of the past were somewhat mentally ill,
paranoid, and likely “nascent fascists” (Stoller, 2019). This was true for the popular
economist of the time, John Kenneth Galbraith, also hired by TCF for similar reasons,
when he claimed that big buyers would create big sellers inevitably — like big business
created big labor — as a “countervailing power”, dismissing the sanguinary battles of
class conflict. Instead, Galbraith (1967, p. 104) states that democratic socialism, like
capitalism, has lost its power to the “technostructure”: “Like promises to enforce the
antitrust laws in the United States, [democratic socialism] is no longer a political
program but an overture to nostalgia.” Though Stoller points to C. Wright Mills’ as a
part of the consensus narrative, Mills was quite clear that the balance of power was a
narrow focus. “In and out of universities,” Mills writes, the attention of analysts “to
middle levels of power obscures the structure of power as a whole,” (Mills, 1956, p. 245).
Moreover, Mills more radical works were not in favor. In an interview with David
Eakins, Mills proposal to the Ford Foundation to produce a new study entitled the “the
cultural apparatus” was rejected (Berman, 1983, p. 31). The Ford Foundation, it was
learned, had no intention of supporting what likely would become “another Power
Elite.” At the same time the C.I.A., a rather controversial donor to the Ford Foundation,
labeled Mills one of the most influential New Left intellectuals, six years after his death
(Summers, 2008). The vital center appreciated big business and the rising crop of chain
stores, so long as they partnered with big government.
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Major domestic policies from Republican Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford
throughout the consensus exhibit political moderation. Eisenhower enacted a tax on war
profits during the Korean War and increased social security and farm subsidies. Nixon
proposed a sweeping universal health care program which would be embroiled as would
must of his policies with Watergate but not before the institution of the EPA and OSHA.
Lastly, Ford under mounting political and economic pressure proposed the “WIN” plan
including public service jobs and a tax cut on the bottom half of society balanced with
revenue from increased oil taxes (Mizruchi, 2013).

Not only were political and academic elites in consensus, the liberal consensus
benefitted from moderates at the helms of businesses. Businesses were loosely
organized around a “moderate consensus” for public policy, led by the CED and CFR,
argues Mizruchi (2013). The political center, labeled liberal by some and moderate by
others, shared an unprecedented uniformity, a shared belief in “enlightened selfinterest” and government involvement in order to account for corporate free-riders.

At the time, businesses were not burdened on a competitive international level, dual
government projects of social welfare and Vietnam had not yet drained resources,
Watergate lay ahead as did the oil shock of the ‘70s, and economic inflation with
unemployment that would defy Keynesian economics had not yet dismantled the liberal
consensus, ultimately giving rise to the conservative Advocacy era (Mizruchi, 2013)
(Smith J. A., 1991). Even the liberal Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 by David
Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski, would issue a report that democracy itself is in
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crisis from widespread university education, mass media, and professionals challenging
the traditional means of social control, therefore democracy should be reduced in order
to be saved from itself (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975, pp. 7-8).

Krippner (2011) argues social, fiscal, and legitimation crises were met in particular by
one industry in the U.S., the financial services industry, that guided and navigated the
U.S. through these pressures of the 1960s and ‘70s. The Ford Motor Company, for
example, has become more profitable selling loans to purchase cars rather than the
actual sale of them. The State, likewise, sought a “solution” in finance, which is
portrayed in three policy shifts: incrementally more permissive regulation of the 1970’s
and ‘80s, reliance on foreign capital inflows after 1980, and the Volcker Shock of
October 1979. The result of these policy shifts, unintended by policymakers at the time,
transformed the U.S. economy and inverted “the public household” Daniel Bell (1976)
had hoped for and rebuilt it in “the shadowy realms of the market” (Krippner, 2011, pp.
21-22). Policymakers, then, “capitalize on crisis” by using “domestic and global capital
markets to resolve domestic political dilemmas”, in part by avoiding “difficult decisions
about how to allocate limited resources between competing social priorities”, setting the
stage for the “financialization” of the U.S. economy.

While these pressures mounted, so did the larger business community coalesce in its
decision to side with the conservative fringe and answer Lewis Powell’s call to arms.2 In
the world of think tanks, the long-standing, free-market conservative AEI was

2

The conservative fringe is embodied by today’s Freedom Caucus, yesterday’s Tea Party, and
yesteryear’s Barry Goldwater.
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generously tapped, likewise the newly formed Heritage Foundation and Koch-seeded
Cato Institute to lead the counterrevolution. These three on the right and the Institute
for Policy Studies on the left are a few of the advocacy think tanks about to enter the
agenda setting process. Just as government investment in social programs had finally
come to match and exceed that of the big three foundations, think tanks deploy more
aggressive tactics and attract new funding sources, creating a boon for think tanks
willing to deviate from the liberal consensus and Government contract era, or for true
believers in a return to a pre-Keynesian political-economy. This outgrowth of think
tanks is not unrelated to the conservative movement. A counterrevolution makes its
start most clearly in the 1970s (Hollis-Brusky, 2015) and most notably in the Heritage
Foundation and AEI as the vehicles for new ideas (Stahl, 2016).

A counter-revolution in law

The success of the liberal consensus in government and moderate consensus in business
could not outweigh the crises of the 1970s. The moderate consensus dissolves under the
pressure while think tanks become more results-oriented in attempts to commoditize
science, foreign governments begin their steady presence in U.S. think tanks, and new
charitable trusts arise or dynastic trusts pass down to heirs with new directions for
social planning.

While the `70s experience a multi-round bout between political and economic crises,
the ideological fracture regarding what to do advances into the Advocacy age, where the
consensus of government research alongside cooperative foundations would soon be
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challenged by a conservative and merchant elite (Smith J. A., 1991) (Mizruchi, 2013)
(Teles, 2008). At the time, American business organization had been minimal and the
leaders felt “economically uncertain, culturally degraded, and legislatively out-foxed in
the early 1970s” argues Waterhouse (2012), and boards in the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Business Roundtable
begin to agitate about their future predicament. Director of the Chamber, Eugene
Sydnor Jr. calls upon friend and neighbor Lewis Powell to pen a strategy.

Hollis-Brusky (2015, p. 147) refers to the shift as a conservative and libertarian counterrevolution orchestrated in law. Not only because of conservative court justices kept “in
check” by the Federalist Society network, but also by creating a climate favorable to
“once-radical ideas or constitutional theories.” Lewis Powell, board member of Phillip
Morris and months from becoming a Supreme Court Justice from Richmond, VA, issued
a call-to-arms in 1971 now known as the Powell Memo, for example. “The Attack on the
American Free Enterprise System”, sent to the US Chamber of Commerce in
confidentiality, laid out a systematic response, a countermovement to the expanding
demands placed on the American economic system. His call to mount a united effort
against left-wing ideology in all forms of idea generation and culture included
surveillance and challenges to: universities, think tanks, and schools; pamphlets,
paperbacks, and textbooks; media, radio, and television; and, finally, to believe
corporations are not being aggressive enough until this becomes their primary concern.
In particular, the Chamber needed its own “faculty of scholars”, incentivized into more
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publishing across the broad spectrum of media.3 The level of aggressive action called for
is worth quoting (Powell, 1971):

There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others
who openly seek destruction of the [American free enterprise] system. There
should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas
for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize
politically those who oppose it… It is time for American business—which has
demonstrated the greatest capacity in all history to produce and to influence
consumer decisions—to apply their great talents vigorously to the preservation
of the system itself.

Business executives soon saw expansive government as “the gravest threat to the
survival of the free enterprise system”, summarize Silk and Vogel (1976), and ideology
was the problem. One executive commented that “we have been successful in selling
products, but not ourselves.”

Powell’s memo is not the sole cause for the so-called rightward shift in politics. But
many think tanks cordial to the business community, like Cato Institute, Heritage
Foundation, Manhattan Institute, Citizens for a Sound Economy, and Americans for

3

Powell was similar in his instructions with regards to foreign policy, offering President Nixon in
1970 another confidential paper entitled “Political Warfare”, stating therein “we must put aside
the self-deception that the techniques of political warfare are unethical or immoral. The fact is
on the domestic scene we employ many of these techniques against each other with
considerable savagery.” (Jeffries Jr., 1994, p. 219)
52

Prosperity, consider this memo an inspiration; indeed, the comprehensive points made
have since been adapted to create a counter-strategy for a public-oriented movement as
well (Farmer, 2015).

Powell’s memo also does not reveal the level of action, if any, taken after its creation.
But a few newly rich foundations with equally few conservative political outlets were
moved, “stirred” by the perceived attack on American businesses like John Olin, heir to
the ammunitions and chemical empire that once rose to prominence in World War I and
II with government contracts, now committed to funding a new political message in
opposition to state social policy (Mayer, 2016).

The Koch brothers, Charles and David, are two names in Forbes top ten wealthiest
people, and practice a conservatism that predates Powell’s memo. Tactically, David is an
overt proponent of neoliberal economics, which he bore out in a run on the Libertarian
ticket as Vice President in 1980. Charles, on the other hand, preferred a more behindthe-scenes role. To a group of businessmen in 1974 Charles gave a warning, “business
and the enterprise system are in trouble, and the hour is late,” importantly he adds, “as
the Powell Memorandum points out” (Mayer, 2016, p. 87). Ed Crane, after serving in the
libertarian campaign of 1976, was asked by Charles to remain in the movement with the
teaser, “how much [money] do you need?” To which, Crane replied “A libertarian think
tank along the model of Brookings or AEI might be nice.” Charles replied “I’ll give it to
you.” And the Cato Institute was founded in 1977. Charles Koch thought the Chicago
school scholars, like Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan, to be “sellouts to the
system” because they preferred an efficient government “when libertarians should be
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tearing it out at the root” (as cited in MacLean, 2017, p. 135, 142). The only quo for the
quid was simple, pure allegiance; “compromise, Koch had made clear, was the kiss of
death.” For this reason, MPS member James Buchanan, of the Virginia school, became a
closer intellectual to Koch’s larger political project.4

New leaders from different backgrounds took the helm at think tanks in the Advocacy
era. Anticipating a political shift, the president of the American Enterprise Association
William Baroody rebranded the non-profit in 1962 as AEI in order to shed itself of its
more trade-like image and “disguise the roots of his organization, to keep it from being
dismissed as a businessman’s group” (Phillips-Fein, 2010). Baroody made his way from
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to head the struggling AEA in 1962. Despite Baroody’s
assistance to the 1964 Goldwater campaign — which attracted the attention of the IRS —
some conservatives considered the think tank rather soft. Going further, a couple former
political staffers believed the rebranded AEI was too reserved and “respectable”, in other
words not conservative enough, not “militant”, according to Phillips-Fein. Former
political staffers Paul Weyrich and Edwin Feulner Jr. would go on to form the Heritage
Foundation with startup funds from the Coors Foundation. From a non-academic
background, Weyrich was a religious political operative known for coining the “moral
majority” with Jerry Falwell and, later, founding the American Legislative Exchange

4

The Cato Institute, therefore, was not the only manifestation of the Kochs, whom began seeding or
funding many tax-exempt organizations, like the Reason Foundation, the Liberty Fund, Citizens for a
Sound Economy which in 1984 split in two — Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks —
Americans for Tax Reform, America Future Fund, Center to Protect Patient’s Rights, Americans for
Limited Government, American Legislative Exchange Council, Americans for Job Security, State
Policy Network, Leadership Institute, including the NRA, the National Association of Manufacturers
and the Heritage Foundation.
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Council. Fuelner served as an analyst in the CSIS, the Richard M. Weaver fellow in the
London School of Economics, and as an aide to congressman Laird before becoming
president of Heritage. Later, in 1981, he would earn his Ph.D. from the University of
Edinburgh. The Cato Institute, by comparison, was led by Ed Crane from 1977 to 2012, a
financial analyst and vice president of the Alliance Capital Management Corporation. In
2012, however, he was pushed out by Charles and David for producing impractical
theories by intellectuals instead of “intellectual ammunition that we can then use at
Americans for Prosperity and our allied organizations”, reports Mayer (2016, p. 285). A
war of ideas.

The Heritage Foundation, considered one of the most influential think tanks in the
1980s, would attract donations first from Joseph Coors and later Richard Mellon Scaife
most notably, but also the Olin Foundation, the Noble Foundation, Pew Freedom Trust,
New York Businessman Lewis Lehrman, Reader’s Digest, and large corporations,
including some from Taiwan and South Korea (Peschek, 1987). Beginning the decade
with a budget of $1 million, the ascendant American Enterprise Institute would attract
enough funding that by 1980 with $10.4 million it surpassed the prestigious Brookings
Institution, receiving funds from over 600 corporations, including the financial and
technological elite (Peschek, 1987) (Ricci, 1993, p 160). In 2010, AEI’s budget was
placed at $29 million, whereas Heritage’s budget is $80 million (McGann, 2016).

The charitable or dynastic trusts that funded conservative organizations also saw a
transformation of their beneficiaries and endowments. In 1973, Richard Mellon Scaife
inherited the family trusts (Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Alleghany and Carthage
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foundations, and the Trust for Sarah Mellon Scaife’s Grandchildren) from his mother,
Sarah Mellon Scaife. The funds, largely derived from oil, Alcoa, and Mellon Bank, were
distributed routinely to conservative think tanks. By 1980, AEI and the Georgetown’s
Center for Strategic and International Studies had received about $5 million each,
Hoover Institution had received over $4 million, and the Heritage Foundation received
over $2.5 million. Public Choice scholar James Buchanan was a Mont Pèlerin Society
(1947) member and an early Scaife recipient after mentioning conservative’s need for a
“counter-Brookings” in order to undermine the “alleged economists.” On this point,
Buchanan who stylized himself as a ‘social philosopher’ was clear, he planned to
construct “the way people think about government” (MacLean, 2017). Finally, Sciafe was
also an underwriter to the Milton Friedman television program “Free to Choose”, as was
the Olin Foundation.

Olin, with $1 million a year to spend at its founding in 1977, for example, was small
compared to the $160 million of the Ford Foundation. But by 1982 the Olin
Foundation’s endowment had risen tenfold to $125 million giving the foundation more
resources. The Smith Richardson Foundation, with Randy Richardson receiving control
in 1973, gave about $3 million a year mostly aimed at supply-side economics. Take Jude
Wanniski (1978), editor of the Wall Street Journal and fellow at AEI, on a grant from
Smith-Richardson wrote The Way the World Works, coining the term “supply-side
economics.” The economic theory would be supported by Olin grantee and Manhattan
Institute fellow Charles Murray. In concert, these new three foundations funded the
Washington University’s Center for the Study of American Business, University of
Chicago’s Center for the study of the Economy and State, and University of Rochester’s
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Center for Research in Government Policy and Business. They also founded the Institute
for Educational Affairs, led by Irving Kristol and William Simon, which would attract
145 corporate donors by 1982 (Himmelstein, 1990).

On the left, by comparison, former political aides Richard Barnett and Marcus Raskin
founded the IPS (1963). After becoming dismayed in the Kennedy administration, they
amassed $200,000 to start an anti-war policy institute and by 1973 had over fifty staff
but saw much less future success in the rise of a counter-revolution. The IPS would be
hampered by legal fees if not the probes and investigations by the FBI in what is known
as COINTELPRO, a covert investigation of the New Left, a term first used by C. Wright
Mills. The surveillance on the IPS was exposed by a former FBI agent in a sworn
affidavit but directors discovered the probes as early as 1971. Court filings reveal there
were more than 60 informants involving the IPS. By 1979, a settlement was reached,
which included the FBI’s admission of guilt, however monetary damages were not
awarded. Additionally, it was revealed that in 1969 Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of staff,
disagreed when an assistant called for the IRS “to go after Brookings and the IPS.”
Haldeman, distrusting the IRS, leaned toward patience adding, if “we really want to
start playing the game tough, you might wish to consider my suggestion of some months
ago that we consider going into Brookings after the classified material which they have
stashed over there” [it was believed Brookings had the Pentagon Papers] (Oudes, 1989,
p. 146). By 1972 the IRS filed charges against the IPS for several tax code violations
dating back to 1966. While IPS would go on to win this case as well, the potential loss
would have absolved the organization. Conversely, Heritage would not attract as much
attention at the time, and AEI’s skirmish with the IRS — keeping Baroody on salary
57

while running Goldwater’s intellectual campaign — in the ‘60s was trivial, according to
Medvetz (2012, pp. 124-127). In 1976, the IPS would suffer further loss as two IPS staff
members were killed in a car bomb on Embassy Row in Washington D.C. targeting
former Chilean President Allende’s ambassador to the US and critic of current Chilean
President Pinochet (Smith J. A., 1991). Heritage’s Mandate for Leadership in 1980 even
listed IPS as a potential internal security threat. At this point, donors dwindled and IPS
was reduced to receiving over half of its funding from one foundation. Although in
2002, IPS has a $2 million budget without any donations from corporations or
government agencies, and about 30 staff members (Abelson, 2006).

It is misleading to consider the breadth of donations equal. While the IPS dwindled
down to one major donor, the Heritage Foundation for instance increased its highprofile donor list, though not quite as much as AEI. Stahl (2016) argues, think tanks,
like Heritage, began marketing themselves as safer alternatives to traditional political
spending in light of the Watergate scandal. AEI had, however, anticipated the void of
conservative policies, in part, when president William Baroody found early support from
anti-new deal businessmen. General Motors, General Electric, Mobil, Proctor and
Gamble had become contributors to AEI, a think tank by now clearly associated with the
political Right (Phillips-Fein, 2010). Heritage, by contrast, was primarily funded by a
select few, according to Medvetz (2012, p. 125), “71 were corporations or corporate
foundations, 41 were individuals or couples, and 39 were philanthropic foundations,” of
whom 44 gave over $100,000. Scaife, the leading contributor, gave $23 million over the
course of 24 years beginning in 1974.
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Scaife would contribute to many think tanks including the CSIS, the Hoover Institution,
the Manhattan Institute, the ICS, and other legal foundations (Hollis-Brusky, 2015). The
Washington Post estimated Sciafe had donated over $100 million to conservative causes
in 1981. But the Bradley foundation would secede Scaife as the largest conservative
foundation by the end of the century, delivering more than $13 million to each, AEI and
Heritage. As a result of conservative foundations, by the 1990s the budget of the
Heritage Foundation surpasses that of the entire liberal cluster in Washington (Rich and
Weaver, 2000).

The deference from technocrats to legislators until after congressional votes in the past
was now seen as an oversight. This new, aggressive and result-oriented approach wound
politics and expertise tighter in setting the agenda (Stahl, 2016). The Heritage Foundation
found success almost immediately with the Reagan Administration. Just seven years after
its founding, Heritage’s Mandate for Leadership became an integral guide to the Reagan
administration prompting Heritage to claim 60 percent of Reagans’ policies are derived
from their report (Peschek, 1987). Aide to the president and future Attorney General
Edwin Meese III, for example, personally received the study. President Reagan would
show direct support to Heritage: “it goes back to what [Richard] Weaver had said and
what Heritage is all about,” the President continued, “Ideas do have consequences.
Rhetoric is policy, and words are action” (Smith J. A., 1991, p. 20).

With the success of Heritage’s Mandate for Leadership, the new political-intellectual
recipe took shape. Ed Crane points to Mandate stating “I guess maybe it did give us the
idea” for Cato’s 1984 report (Richberg, 1984). Policy shops sparked and various reports
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with similar hopes of persuading the agenda showered on presidential candidate George
H.W. Bush, leaving him to choose from at least 36, mostly from think tanks.

So, after three Republican administrations, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI),
funded by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), proffered the Mandate for
Change to the Clinton administration (Rich, 2004). The PPI found success with Clinton,
in part, according to William Galston a former PPI fellow, by stumping around the
country at events without campaigning for president, publishing policy ideas in
hardcover, and validating Clinton’s ideas by giving him a political platform inside the
beltway (Medvetz, 2012).

Think tanks also bolster the credibility of their craft with ritual rewards as symbols of
achievement and prestige. Milton Friedman, for example, said that the announcement
of a Nobel award (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 453):

converts its recipients into an instant expert on all and sundry, and unleashes
hordes of ravenous newsmen and photographers from journals and TV stations
around the world. I myself have been asked my opinion on everything from a
cure for the common cold to the market value of a letter signed by John F.
Kennedy. Needless to say the attention is flattering but also corrupting.

The Memorial Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences is commonly seen as the pinnacle of
academic achievement, given to those who ‘had conferred the greatest benefit to
mankind’ in the last year. MPS member James Buchanan had suggested they mirror the
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newly formed Nobel in economics, then without an MPS winner, as an attempt to
glamourize conservatism (MacLean, 2017). But with economics the empirical evidence
to support the award is arguable and less like prizes in chemistry and physics. By
example, polar opposites in literary economics Gunnar Myrdal and Friedrich von Hayek
shared the Nobel Prize of 1974, each submitting a speech addressing the very
persuasiveness of a ‘science’ built on a foundation that must involve morals and values.
The near mechanical split, argue Offer and Söderberg, between liberals (26 NPWs) and
conservatives (25 NPWs), as well as between formalists and empiricists, is intended to
give the appearance of neutrality (where in academia there is little) in order to avoid
politicization. Indeed, flat-earthers may be given a platform but that does not objectively
mean the debate is balanced or neutral; nor does the stork and the mother have equal
claim to the origin of children. Though the award may have begun on a whim of the
Swedish National Bank reacting to pressures from social democracy, the prize has
nevertheless maintained an unmatched level of symbiotic prestige linking eminent
scholar and Nobel prize (Offer & Söderberg, 2016).

A few think tanks follow this practice, blending the institution with the right academics
and political entrepreneurs. The Cato Institute’s biennium Milton Friedman Prize is
lucrative ($500,000 in 2002) if however less venerable and seems to carry less prestige
than the Nobel (Offer & Söderberg, 2016). AEI created the Francis Boyer Award, named
after an early AEI donor and CEO of Smith, Klein, and French, and first bestowed the
honor to President Gerald Ford in 1977 and then President Reagan in 1989.5 In 2003,

5

Several recipients are from law (Robert Bork, Anton Scalia, and Clarence Thomas), some are
political operatives (Henry Kissinger, Jeanne Kirkpatrick) and financiers (Paul Volcker).
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the award was renamed in honor of Irving Kristol and bestowed to Allan Meltzer,
Charles Murray, David Patreus, and most recently Nikki Haley in 2019. The Heritage
Foundation held its first-ever Honors gala in 2019 with Vice President Pence headlining
the event, which included the delivery of their pinnacle award: the Clare Booth Luce
award to Edward Fuelner. Previous recipients include Ronald Reagan (who beforehand
awarded Clare Luce with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the first female member of
Congress recipient and vocal critic of Roosevelt’s war), Milton and Rose Friedman,
William F. Buckley, Rush Limbaugh, and Roger Ailes.

EPI celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary with a Distinguished Economist award to
Paul Krugman and awards to labor leaders, Hoffmann and Mitchell from Wisconsin.
The neoliberal Information Technology and Innovation Foundation launched the
Luddite Awards, as a PR stunt meant to dishonor its recipients as anti-technologists (a
misnomer to luddites) including Steve Wozniak for supporting a ban on “killer robots”,
Stephen Hawking, and Elon Musk (Rauch, 2018).

At the same time that America witnesses an explosion of partisan think tanks, it is
important to note the politician’s ability to rely on bi-partisan publicly-funded research
has plummeted. Some vital statistics kept by the Brookings Institution are helpful (see
figure 2.1). From steady support throughout the Reagan and Bush I administrations, the
number of congressional staff from support agencies falls by a third in the Clinton
administration, House staff declined as well.
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A more nuanced view (see figure 2.2) reveals a steady decline of congressional support
agency staffs. Under Clinton’s budget cuts legislative resources were decimated,
absolving of the OTA in 1995 but particularly the GAO despite being considered the least
partisan of the remaining three support agencies, and to say little of the Library of
Congress (Bimber, 1996). The declining trend, if held, bodes gravely for the remaining
legislative resources. Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Trump
administration, Mick Mulvaney claimed that the time for the CBO “has come and gone”
(Cottle, 2017). A somewhat odd claim from the head of the OMB considering evidence
the CBO is routinely more accurate in their budget assessments by comparison (Bimber,
1996).

Figure 2. 1: Congressional Staff

Frederick Mosher (1984) provides an early comparison of two publicly funded think
tanks that originated under the same law in 1921, the GAO and OMB. While they have
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since moved toward each other in practice, particularly with their interest in the future,
they have also diverged unto their respective overseers leading Mosher to term them the
Congressional agency and Presidential agency, respectively. Their products are written
communication, primarily; they write to Congress but even for Congressional support
staff, “its best channel to Congress is the media — the press and television” (Mosher,
1984, p. 174).
Figure 2. 2: Staffs of Congressional Support Offices
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Source: The Brookings Institution 2019, Vital Statistics on Congress

Though the tendency for the executive branch to have an ostensibly more political think
tank than the bi-partisan congressional support agencies, for example, is easily arrived
at, the overall importance and trust in these publicly-funded experts however is
unmatched in the non-profit sector, according to many congressional members,
including Sen. Orrin Hatch (Bimber, 1996).
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Think tanks emerged in a period of unfathomable private wealth directed at improving
government and repairing social strife, as well as purposive reimaging of the robber
barons. Depoliticized experts were funded to help government think and usher in a
nation-sized administration, like with the creation of the Bureau of the Budget as well as
the Government Accountability Office. The Government Contract era saw for the most
part concerted goals between foundations, government, and experts. The far-right think
tanks were disorganized, cautious, and more comfortable in Geneva than America.
However, under economic and social pressures, elite conflict, and declining trust in
Government, the Advocacy era boomed with policy windows that had not been open for
forty years if ever, simultaneously honing new tactics for experts speaking to and
influencing policy makers.
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Ch. 3 Politics and the Media
The common belief of the political landscape is that of reasoned debate, an endless flux
of give and take between well-intentioned policymakers. However, the current moment
in political history is arguably a period of critical realignment among the parties
(Greenberg, 2015). Some, like Mann and Ornstein (2012) reject the democratic
stalemate caused by drifting parties in lieu of a more radical leap by the Republican
party in a dramatic turn to the right. Whereas the Democratic party shows signs of
drifting, it has more or less stayed in its historical political lane. Since 1972, the right
turn of Republicans has ventured into unexplored conservatism as measured by roll-call
votes in figure 3.1, and Democrats coalesce similar to the unity after the first World War
(Lewis, et al., 2019).

The Republican party is captured by a conservative fringe in a “race to the base”, the
base being the most devoted members of the party, according to Mann and Ornstein.
Moreover, the Republican playbook has narrowed to that of tax-cut prescriptions as a
cure-all, which has led to the appearance of political entrepreneurs with prepackaged
solutions looking for problems rather than building consensus (Hacker & Pierson,
2005). At the same time, this gives the republican party the impression of unity or
consensus relative to Democrats. Most importantly, a cross-disciplinary study of the
resultant political landscape makes the claim that increasing polarization, aided by
rampant inequality, and a media that disrupts the flow of information are
interconnected, mutually enhancing their impact on the stability of democracy
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(Wiesner, et al., 2018). For example, the elite, particularly the young and rich,
decreasingly value the legitimacy of liberal democracy (Mounk, 2018, pp. 109-110). This
group approved of military rule at a rate of six percent twenty years ago but that figure
has since exploded fivefold to 35 percent. American millenials think of democracy as a
bad or very bad system of government 23 percent of the time. The highest international
average, for comparison, is Russia with 26 percent.

The main driver of polarization, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, p. 223) argue, is that the
Republican leadership has been “eviscerated” by wealthy 501(c)4s like Americans for
Prosperity, Americans for Tax Reform and so on, that have been able to frame the
agenda using “scorched earth” tactics, boxing out party members unaligned. A second
cause is the rising influence of right-wing media, surpassing the party’s own leadership
at times. These two sources of influence in the Republican party have in concert
eviscerated the party’s leadership structure.

This chapter of the study will review the political and media landscape in which think
tanks operate. As interconnected phenomena, politics and the media are difficult to
separate as one informs the other in cycle; changes in politics reflect changes in media.
More specifically, I will review how this increasingly complex terrain impacts think
tanks and their products, compelling them toward predatory and negligent behavior at
times. Finally, I argue that science, experts, and modern think tanks are both symptoms
and causes to the information crisis in U.S. politics.
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Figure 3. 1: The Polarization of Congress

Source: “The Polarization of Congress” https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization.

The political landscape must first be placed in context of rising social inequality, a
chasm misunderstood by the public more generally (Norton & Ariely, 2011; see figure
3.2). Some argue inequality itself is the issue, notable as the middle-class vanishes
(Sitaraman, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015; Temin, 2017), and an argument that would not matter
politically so long as the wealthy and the rest of population held similar views. Or, put
another way, it is difficult to expect people to see problems the same way when they
experience them so differently.6 Given heightened inequality, voters should be redefined
as investors in an update to the downsian median-voter theorem. Representatives, then,
“leap-frog” one another in order to attact the most investors (Ferguson, 1995). The

6

From 2008 to 2018, real GDP in Democrat districts increased from $35.7 to $49 billion, whereas
Republican districts dropped from $33.3 to $32.6 billion, and Republicans gained 5% of House seats
in the same time. When it comes to the median pocketbook, Democrat districts saw household
income increase 17 percent, while Republican districts fell 3 percent (Zitner & Chinni, 2019).
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Institute for New Economic Thinking issued a working paper utilizing the medianinvestor theorem on campaign spending, the tip of the iceberg when it comes to finance
in elections. Since 1980, with exception to but a couple races, the investor argument has
been well approximated (Ferguson, Jorgensen, & Chen, 2016). While others (Gilens,
2012) corroborate the significant role of the affluent in policy, Page, Bartels, and
Seawright (2013, p. 67) study the ultra rich, more specifically those in .01% of yearly
U.S. income in order to glean what are the ultra rich’s level of political activity and
perspectives compared to the general public. Notably, the ultra-rich are much more
concerned about budget deficits and more favorable to cutting social programs,
“especially Social Security and Health Care”, than the public. Specifically, those who are
paid $5-40 million are “less favorable to increasing government regulation of Wall
Street firms, the healthcare industry, small business,” and importantly “large
corporations.” However, Bartels maintains that the affluent have always been
influential, even in more equal countries (Achen & Bartels, 2016).
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Figure 3. 2: The actual United States wealth distribution plotted against
the estimated and ideal distributions.7

Source: (Norton & Ariely, 2011)

But this is not to say party differences necessarily equate to simple differences in wealth
or that parties have no mutual grounds (Piketty, 2018). Winters (2011) makes the
argument that income defense becomes the pinnacle objective of the ultra-rich,
regardless of party, hoodwinking the merely affluent and surmounting belief in
democracy. Following this line of thought, Lindsey and Teles (2017) find common
ground for either party to address corruption, put in terms of “captured” economies, in
which a small faction is able to produce a regressive system through the capture of
regulation in myriad ways. For the left and the right, this capture allows the US to be
dominated by rent-seeking. The left, for instance, believe that ‘natural’ market
tendencies create inequality and that the government should rectify this, simultaneously
blind to captured government regulators reinforcing inequality, like in the financial
sector. The right, likewise, will decry government involvement as industries are over-

7

In the "Actual" line, the bottom two quintiles are not visible because the lowest quintile owns just
0.1% of all wealth, and the second-lowest quintile owns 0.2%.
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regulated, slowing growth, simultaneously stating that the distribution of wealth is OK
(Mankiw, 2013), and blind to redistributed wealth caused by rent-seeking. Such capture,
ultimately, stifles downstream innovation by cornering markets and industries and
intensifies inequality.

Perhaps most importantly, the American Dream is less and less a reality with
entrenched wealth. From a captured economy and rising inequality, we then witness the
generational relationship to inequality (Corak, 2013), in which intergenerational
mobility is strongly associated to inequality, indicating family background matters more
than hard work. Alan Kreuger, chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors,
deemed these data “the Great Gatsby Curve.”
Though wealth and income inequality have reached levels unseen since the Gilded age,
economic policy and inequality is not the only concern in American politics. If Levitsky
and Ziblatt point to supply-side threats such as ultra-rich donors and effective right
wing media, as a top-down force on liberal democracy, others point to compounding
demand-side threats from the people. Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) not only reference
popular claims of relative deprivation, but also distrusted politicians, de-aligned
parties, and the deconstruction of national identities. Put simply, wealthy, educated
politicians are increasingly insulated, leaving them detached from their constituents.
Moreover, this has led to parties severed from the desires of the people, which include
distrust of free-trade as well as immigration. This is to say orthodox economics, alone, is
insufficient if one is to address the popular claims rising in liberal democracies.
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Think tanks, anxious to influence policy, increasingly rely on result-oriented activity
that produce win-win solutions with their donors. Sometimes this behavior is lauded,
but in others it is predatory, and in the process absolves them of their lofty credibility.
Instead of leveraging shared values from stakeholders, think tank products align with
their donors’ interests, neither transparently fair to nor in the publics’ interests, despite
public subsidization in the form of tax-deductions and -exemptions.

This following section will review the political parameters of think tanks and other social
welfare groups in a captured economy. What follows is the operational space within
which think tanks conduct themselves. Kingdon ([1984]/2011) suggests jurisdictional
competition that cuts across executive and legislative branches can lead to battles that
increase movement on the agenda, while others result in a stalemate. Sometimes,
institutions attempt to see around corners in order to curb the need for legislation. In
this case, institutional foresight is stymied by sterilizing legislation. The IRS’s attempt to
get a grasp on the thriving think tanks industry is illustrative.

Above the law
Crossroads GPS is tapped for scrutiny by the IRS when it applied for social welfare
status as a tax-exempt 501(c)4. Crossroads was one of the best funded social welfare
501(c)4s, founded by Karl Rove, George W. Bush’s deputy chief of staff, which ostensibly
attracts attention to the organization as a political entity. Understandable attention,
according to AEI scholar Norm Ornstein (2016), Crossroads should be a 527-political
organization but Rove chose to file it as a 501(c)4 because 527s must disclose their
donors. The intention was made quite explicit by Crossroads political director Carl Forti
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in 2010: “You know, disclosure was very important to us, which is why the [super PAC]
was created. But some donors didn’t want to be disclosed, and, therefore, the (c)4 was
created” (Maguire, 2016). In effect, anonymously funded social welfare groups are
subsidized by the public, aiding the work of government, and “government”, Woodrow
Wilson (1961, p. 76) wrote, “ought to be all outside and no inside.” Today, anonymity
around social welfare groups is a very political issue, attracting funds from foreign
investors which I will address later. In the public and among those familiar with think
tanks, a majority (67%) wish to see donors transparent (Hashemi & Muller, 2018).

The vote on HR 5053 Preventing IRS Abuse and Protecting Free Speech in 2016 is a
good litmus test for politicization regarding anonymous donations in 501(c)4s.
Currently, donations over $5,000 must still be disclosed only to the IRS. This bill allows
501(c)4s to completely avoid disclosing their donors to the IRS, under claims of tedious
paperwork (Govtrack.us, 2019). Passing the House, votes were nearly split down party
lines, all but one Republican voted “Aye” and all but one Democrat voted “Nay.” The bill
would die in the Senate, but similar party lines could easily be forecasted.

Definitions must be addressed before going further. The IRS (IRS, 2019) treats political
activity and lobbying differently, depending on the charitable organization section used,
501(c)3 or 501(c)4. Only 501(c)4s may engage in political activity and “germane”
lobbying toward legislation, so long as they operate “exclusively to promote social
welfare” (this is further refined to “primary” activity, or rather, a benchmark of more
than half of an organization’s expenditures). Neither group may engage directly or
indirectly with campaigns. 501(c)3 donations are tax-deductible and tax-exempt;
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501(c)4 donations are tax-exempt but not tax-deductible nor publicly available — in
other words, dark money. Think tanks have registered under either classification; some
have sister (c)4s like the Center for American Progress Action Fund (founded in 2004)
and Heritage Action for America (founded in 2010), which can accept unlimited
anonymous donations and then transfer resources to its sister 501(c)3 think tank, a
transaction which does not qualify as political activity. Not to be confused, these
organizations differ from 527s and Super Pacs which are allowed to be primarily
political but must disclose their (potentially unlimited) donors, and do not have to
operate “exclusively [primarily] to promote social welfare.” 501(c)4s, albeit, can also
give unlimited funds to Super Pacs, 501(c)3s, or 527, again not considered political
activity, and easily circumnavigating reporting guidelines.

During the investigation of Crossroads GPS, tax-exempt applications increased but not
near the rate dark money ballooned. Over the course of 2000-2010 about $100 million
was spent in (c)4s; in 2012, it was $300 million, with conservative causes flush with
cash after receiving 85 percent of the total (Choma, 2013). While applications from 2010
increased more than a thousand to 2774 in 2012, only eight 501(c)4 applications to the
IRS in 2012 were denied (IRS - SOI, 2019). In 2016, so few were denied of the 1877
applications that the number could not be disclosed in order to protect the identity of
taxpayers. In 2018, over half of all dark money groups opted not to disclose donor
information, as a note on the scale of anonymity in (c)4s (Center for Responsive Politics,
2019).
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To be clear Crossroads is less of a think tank (not one for my study) and more of a
financial headquarters to a movement but shares the same tax-exempt social welfare
status as many think tanks, exemplifying some of the definitional complexities
aforementioned and the broad legal swath social welfare groups are afforded.

In the review of Crossroads GPS activity, it was determined just two percent of their
budget went to issue advocacy and social welfare, most was transferred to other political
groups and all but one television ad took place over an eleven-week window prior to the
election in 2010 and, importantly, in 2013 Crossroads GPS was denied tax-exempt
status (Maguire, 2016).

The designation was short lived, however, and the IRS reversed its decision. Despite
bipartisan and independent investigations reporting no wrongdoing, in 2015, the IRS
backed off of Crossroads like the 90% of unanswered calls that were made during 2015’s
filing season and the 13,000 employees let go since 2010 due to budget cuts.

The new IRS commissioner John Koskinen jumpstarted a team to clarify “the facts and
standards” organizations use to determine (c)4 applications. “What we’re trying to do is
not change the rules of the game but to have a clearer set of guidelines” Koskinen tells
the Senate Finance Committee, “clarify, not change the rules in which these
organizations operate… clarity will benefit everyone.” Republican Sen. Hatch replied
with alternative directions, to wit: “I strongly encourage you to stop spending agency
time on such controversial and counterproductive proposals” in the IRS targeting
investigation hearing on October 27, 2015. Democratic Sen. Nelson pushes Koskinen
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further on his guidance for (c)4s, and Koskinen replies that there are three questions
they are exploring: “What is the definition of political activity? How much can you do?
And to which (c) organization should the standard apply.” Afterwards, republican
pressure on Koskinen and the IRS becomes ascendant.

Under the guise of infringing free speech, Republicans attacked Koskinen for the
investigation of Crossroads GPS and other Tea party groups. Then, impeachment began
to be tossed around for “misleading Congress about his predecessors.” Rep. Chaffetz
believed deception was at hand and led the charge against Koskinen. This was despite
conclusive independent investigations from the Department of Justice that warranted
no charges to his predecessor or himself (Rein, 2015). It should be added, impeachment
was unprecedented at this administrative rank. Though the alleged actions for
impeachment took place before Koskinen became commissioner, House Republicans
were undeterred by the DOJ and were not only going after his job, they wanted to retract
Koskinen’s pension.

The security of his job was one tactic of the battle, but Republicans sought to prevent
any gross changes to social welfare groups and protect anonymity. A Republican
legislative assault rose in the House during this investigative period. Members Grassley,
Coats, Cornyn, Flake, and Ryan each submitted bills proposing to amend all manner of
501(c)4s, including allowing (c)4s to be tax-deductible, prohibiting the disclosure of
donors to the IRS, increased penalties for unauthorized inspections, required
notification to Congress when the IRS Commissioner decides not to fire an employee,
mandatory unpaid leave for no less than 30 days for reviewing a (c)4 with scrutiny based
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on ideology expressed in the name or purpose of the organization, rules for tax
classification from 2010 should remain unchanged until 2017, or redirects (c)4
applications after 270 days to Federal courts etc. Though the scorched earth tactics leave
nothing behind, Koskinen, a careerist known for his leadership in the Clinton
administration with the Y2K transition, persevered and stepped down under his own
volition in 2017 at 78 stating “survival is its own reward” (Rappeport, 2017).

The treatment of the IRS exemplifies how scorched earth tactics failed to permit a
constructive debate over what is inherently political, given by the vote on HR 5053, but
also must occur in order to ascertain the taxable or non-taxable criterion for “political
activity”, “exclusively”, and “primarily.” Moreover, the limits to political activity appear
to be redrawn with the success of Crossroads GPS and Karl Rove, if drawn at all.
Furthermore, jurisdictional competition resulted in a stalemate as the IRS was defanged
as an institution and its commissioner intimidated. Result-driven ultra-rich are,
therefore, able to funnel economic resources toward ideological movements unhindered,
thus creating vehicles for propaganda that prey on the knowledge and understanding of
the public. Perhaps more importantly, the debate over the ways transparency interacts
or relates to political activity was checked and blocked, leaving think tanks carte blanch
when it comes to (c)4 activity.

Thinking globally
Foreign relationships with domestic think tanks are increasingly common. McGann
(2016)argues, on one hand, think tanks forge “bridges across national borders” while
Stone (2004) argues, on the other hand, proto-think tanks exported the westernized

77

think tank model to the developing world which further frustrates the relationship
between research and policy given unequal power dynamics. Indeed, both views are
supported in the literature as international academic cooperation is facilitated by think
tanks expanding to global markets, like Brookings with offices in Qatar, China, and
India at the same time pan-European think tanks have opened offices in major capitols.
The European Council on Foreign Relations has offices in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome,
and Madrid. This suggests credence to Rich (2004), for example, where Washington,
D.C. based think tanks are more likely to receive opportunities to testify in Congress and
gain visibility in the news.

Some think tanks receive substantial funding from foreign governments, individuals,
and corporations. Investments from foreign countries complicate matters of foreign
agents, particularly with concern to tax-exemption and transparency. AEI, for instance,
received over half a million dollars from Taiwan, an act which appears to draw more
attention to whether or not foreign agents are at work than whether or not that activity
be subsidized by U.S. government (Clifton, 2013). Economic and military support of
Taiwan has long been promoted as AEI’s VP of Asia Studies, Dan Blumenthal — also the
CEO of Pacific Solutions LLC, a company dedicated to expanding business in the Asian
marketplace. In a hearing titled “The China Challenge”, Blumenthal testified to
Congress about the importance of Taiwan (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
2018): “the era of reform in China is over and probably [has been] for 10 years… China
is back to running state enterprises directed by the party” and “Taiwan stands as
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‘ground zero’ for China’s coercive economic activities.”8 In closing, Blumenthal states
the “greatest economic coercion strategy… on China is helping to build free-market
trade agreements and free-market economics in Asia” that exclude China.

Troubled diplomatic relationships with foreign governments extend to think tanks when
accepting foreign donations from the government in question, particularly in confusion
after a tragedy or crisis. In a special on C-SPAN, CQ/Roll Call’s Tom Frank (2019) made
a comparison of think tank responses during the brief political vacuum after the murder
of Jamal Khashoggi (and before the U.N.’s investigative report blaming Saudi Arabia),
and argues responses are illustrative of foreign influence. Political inaction or suspicion
was the expert advice of CSIS, to distrust claims of murder and torture; whereas
Brookings, on the other hand, came out early against the murder and relations with the
Saudi government. Behind the scenes, the Saudis are regular donors to CSIS, and
Qataris, enemies of the Saudis (Al Jazeera, 2017), donate to Brookings.

In response to the murder, Ben Freeman, director of the Foreign Influence
Transparency Initiative, writes (2019) “the Saudi lobby in Washington is feverishly
contacting Executive branch officials and Congressional offices to stymie legislation that
would punish Saudi Arabia for its actions, and they’re likely making campaign
contributions to those same Members of Congress.” By examining supplemental

8

Specifically citing China’s reluctance to identify Taiwan (gleaned via apologies to China from
Delta and Marriot for listing Taiwan as a country in which it operates), China’s state-owned
enterprises pressure Taiwanese businessman to vote pro-China, China’s attraction of Taiwanese
top talent, and military practices on Taiwanese shores, amounts to Blumenthal’s coercive
activities.
79

statements made to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which require
registered foreign agents to report all “political activity”, Saudis engaged in at least 1900
political activities through many firms like the MSL group (formerly Qorvis
Communication) and APCO Worldwide. These firms, then, made contact at least 64
times to think tanks. This figure is the floor of the various firms’ activities because
contact to think tanks was not overly descriptive with dates, times, who was contacted
whether by interview or email, rather, 64 indicates if contact was made in the last 6
months at least once.

Situations like the murder of Khashoggi put think tanks, and in some cases the
universities that house these think tanks, on precarious standing. This concern is raised
if strong laws on foreign influence are not in place argues Project On Government
Oversight director Lydia Dennett (2019). Saudi companies, individuals, and the Saudi
Kingdom have spent over $89 million in 2017, namely at George Washington
University. Saudi Arabia is not the biggest foreign contributor, however. Giving over $1
billion is the small country of Qatar with less than 2.5 million people and known
supporter of U.S. deemed terrorist group Hamas. While disclosure is mandated by
participating in the federal student-aid program, the FBI claims some foreign
investments are a ploy for access to emerging technologies. According to Amnesty
International, the credibility of universities is diminished for those who are willing to
work with nations that do not support democratic values.

Rising global conflict will draw closer scrutiny to those policy organizations unwilling to
sever ties from their more illiberal foreign donors. As evidenced above, China attracts
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Congress’ attention for their dominant state-military-run economy. Senators and
Representatives have, for example, called on universities to close Confucius Institutes
(CI) amid critical testimony from director of the FBI, Christopher Wray. At least ten
such institutes have closed, with president of Texas A&M citing concern from two
representatives as the impetus for its closure (Redden, 2018; Redden, 2019). The
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States issued a
report that not all but some PRC diplomats and students of CI intimidate, censor
“sensitive content”, and threaten the safety of faculty, students, and administrators in
U.S. universities, particularly cash-strapped public universities but also “wealthy Ivy
League institutes” and small liberal arts colleges (Lloyd-Damnjanovic, 2018). Among
other monitoring- and cost-related recommendations, the report seeks clarity on
distinguishing between “academic” and “scholastic” exemptions from FARA.

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, a new elite see themselves as world
citizens “participating in a global market [and] supporting international trade and
migration”, argues the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies director
(Huntington, 2004). More recently the emphasis has been on the freedom of capital to
travel to international markets with less focus on the freedom of labor to travel (e.g.
Brexit and Trump). As world citizens, there is elite consensus with regards to market
globalization, argues Piketty (2018), among the Brahmin left and Merchant right both
supporting open international markets, disembarking from protectionist economic
policies that were prominent for much of U.S. history (Bairoch, 1993). Think tanks may
become captive by the elite mindset, much like politicians or regulators, concerning
global capital markets by cognitive or epistemic capture (Kwak, 2014).
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Transformational leaders with global experience are taking the helm of these
institutions. Brookings Institution, for example, is headed by John Rutherford Allen, a
retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. U.S.
deputy secretary of defense during the Clinton administration John J. Hamre has been
CEO of CSIS since 2000 and in 2007 Donald Rumsfeld made him chairman of the
Defense Policy Board. The Cato Institute is headed by MPS member and former
Barclays Capital banker Peter Goettler.

This is not to say global think tanks advocate for a monolithic political-economic
system, though some do. Frederick Hayek, Milton Friedman, Frank Knight founded the
Mont Pèlerin Society as an early European think tank in 1947. Hayek, thereby, fulfilled
his own recommendation to Antony Fisher not to run for political office because “the
decisive influence in the battle of ideas and policy was wielded by intellectuals” and
instead to change the way politicians think with a “scholarly institute”, or “something
halfway between a scholarly association and a political society” (Burgin, 2009; Curtis,
2011). Hayek developed a ‘neoliberalism’ that would give rise to the Chicago (Friedman)
and Virginia (Buchannan, Gordon, and Tullock) schools of thought but differs in that
American neoliberalism fails to adequately take account for the rest of the world;
European neoliberals did not have such luxuries, argues Slobodian (2018). While James
Buchannan and Milton Friedman, both MPS members and Nobel Prize winners,
involved themselves globally, for example, in 1970s Chile, the successes of the EEC and
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WTO point to the hopes similar to that of MPS and “ordoglobalism”: an institutionalized
international market system unencumbered from federated nations, democracies, or
empires. Ordoglobalism is less a theory of markets or economics than of law and state,
argues Slobodian. Like contemporaries Keynes and Polanyi, Hayek and the Geneva
school agree the market does not and cannot take care of itself as if by invisible hands.
But unlike Keynes and Polanyi, the role of government involved should be skeletal. The
Geneva school serves as status quo and income protection, in part, because democracy is
not a prerequisite, nor is justice, redistribution, or equality, simply the institution. For
neoliberals, the struggle becomes how to reconcile Hayek’s market, as the greatest
“information processor” nature provides, with the realization such markets have not
come about naturally, but must be constructed (Mirowski, 2013). Much like the
boundarilessness of Huntington’s (2004) “emerging global superclass,” ordoglobalism
supports a jurisdictional global market for capital of the state and yet superseding the
state.

Showing variation to the neoliberal framework of MPS, AEI does not fully engage in a
global market, as Senior Fellow Michael Greve (2000) argues, due to the lack of exits
for capital under such monolithic arrangements, “A world without borders is a world
without exits. We need exits.” In other words, capital needs a federated neoliberalism in
Greve’s view. On exits, Albert Hirschman agrees in part because they signal failings
powerfully. Sunstein (2019) cites the need to opt-out, another form of exit, as imperative
to freedom. On the other hand, the left-leaning New America seems to pivot towards a
more seamless global economic system, mobilizing capital under a “Bretton Woods II”
by combining blockchain technology with “impact investments” (New America, 2019).
83

Nevertheless, a world market for think tanks bring increased competition to specialize,
focusing on geographic regions, political topics, or ideologically leanings. This also gives
donors opportunities to narrowly tailor their gifts, while simultaneously convoluting
attempts at rankings and the need for improved definitions (Lopez, 2013).

Foreign investment has complicated the tax-exempt status and traditional roles of
domestic think tanks, allowing manipulation toward foreign goals. On the other hand,
emerging markets have been ripe for the development of globally-focused think tanks,
like the MPS, and global leaders with international experience are brought on to lead
domestic think tanks hoping to expand transnationally. With the revolving door and
interlocks between government, business, media, and academia, as well as the
interconnectedness within think tanks, foreign influence and international interest are
likely to spread. These revolutions are not entirely inevitable but they also bring the
importance of transparency to the forefront of think tank’s role in policy making.

Lies My Think Tank Told Me
The political landscape creates opportunity for predatory behavior in think tanks
masquerading as experts of the enlightenment. The Brookings Institution hosted a panel
of prominent think tank directors in January entitled “Why Facts and Think Tanks
Matter” (Brookings Institution, 2019). Panelist Paolo Magri, director of the Italian
Institution for International Policy Studies, is warning when he says he “has one fear…
building up fake think tanks — not fake news, fake think tanks — is extremely easy
because there is a wide and broad definition of think tanks”, particularly when
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authoritarian regimes focus on idea dissemination in order to bolster and continue their
policies with an air of credibility. The concern of fake think tanks deserves further
attention as it is their products and services which most clearly attract this classification
and threaten liberal democracies. What do fake think tanks do?

Publishing, for instance, is a fundamental component to each think tank impacted by
the political and media landscapes. A new think tank, the Center for Global Research
Development for example, is publishing several journals in already crowded fields with
what have since been found to be copied titles by other publishers (Brezgov, 2019).
Others have accepted machine-generated submissions, like the American Research
Institute for Policy Development’s publishing of “Robots No Longer Considered
Harmful” by I.P. Freely, Jacques Strap, and Oliver Clothesoff. Exposing the prevalence
of these journals, Jeffrey Beall (2019) published a list for many years (including the two
mentioned above) with hundreds of predatory publishers and journals that often charge
for publication yet provide no review. Some include “Social Science Journals”,
“Academic Research Journals”, “Journal of Comprehensive Research”, the “Institute of
Doctors, Engineers, and Scientists” and so on.

Some manufacture predatory academic conferences as well. Founded in 1997 by the DCbased 501(c)3 Center for Public Integrity, the International Consortium for Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) is widely known for the Panama Papers, attracting the Pulitzer Prize
for its exposé. In a lesser known investigation into “fake science”, the ICIJ reports
“bogus” conferences, like those organized by the World Academy of Science,
Engineering, and Technology (WASET) are held in addition to creating predatory
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journals (Alecci, 2018a). Some simply charge a fee to be published in their scientific
journal. Others “are beyond being for-profit or commercialized. They basically aim to rip
off those researchers who are academically poor” by charging participation fees to
speakers. At the end of the day, hundreds of thousands of scientists have published
studies in journals that lack the traditional peer-review checks for accuracy and quality,
while publishing requirements have only become increasingly dire (Flaherty, 2019). “In
Germany alone, more than 5,000 scientists — including those supported by public
funding — have published their articles in such predatory journals, which have been
increasing for the past five years”, according to Alecci (2018b). On the other hand,
perhaps more alarming is the extent to which ambitious experts will go to meet this
supply. Hvistendahl (2013) explains how Chinese academic hopefuls will bribe for
writing credits or plagiarize journal articles in an extreme example of the quip “publish
or perish.”

The International Life Science Institute (ILSI) exhibits the hallmarks of predation. ILSI
was created by Coca Cola 40 years ago and has become a global think tank that
publishes Nutrition Reviews, holds seminars and conferences, and assists governments
(Jacobs, 2019). Funded by hundreds of corporations including PepsiCo and General
Mills, and formerly Mars, which withdrew support last year for ILSI’s “advocacy-led
studies.” But not before the World Health Organization criticized and then barred the
organization from involvement setting food and water standards in 2006 when evidence
of their stealth political support to industry came forward. Further expulsions from the
WHO followed in 2015 but ILSI has been active in India, delaying the use of red warning
labels for unhealthy items out of ardent concern for sales.
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Distinguished scholar of the Brookings Institution Dr. Robert Litan spoke to Congress in
2015 as a “non-resident senior fellow” about the kickbacks financial advisors receive for
steering clients to higher-priced annuities and investments. While the Department of
Labor reported this policy to cost American consumers $17 billion a year and thus the
DoL attempted to curb the practice, Dr. Litan presented to Congress his report stating
the abolishment of advisor kickbacks would actually cost the American consumer up to
$80 billion (Warren, 2017)—a swing of up to $97 billion. As it turns out, the
independent expert had received funding from an investment service company, Capital
Group, and after the public was made aware of Dr. Litan’s economic conflicts of
interests and exposed his corporate funders, he resigned from the prestigious Brookings
Institution. And Brookings would later amend their rules on conflicts of interests
(Hamburger, 2015). Ten years prior, Dr. Litan had been ranked one of the top two,
“high-quality” economic scholars at leading economic think tanks in The International
Economy (Trimbath, 2005); Litan has since been invited to join memberships of the
Council on Foreign Relations and focuses on the rising concerns of “growing labor
shortages” as companies struggle to fill jobs (Alden & Litan, 2017). In another example,
the Atlantic Council offers a speaking opportunity to executives “with top U.S. and
foreign leaders’ present” if a minimum $50,000 donation materializes; with $100,000 a
donor will ascend from the “Chairman’s circle” to the “Global Leadership Circle” and be
allowed to request one private roundtable meeting with experts towards company needs
and rotation of company logo on its website (New York Times, 2016).
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Result-oriented donors commoditize the think tank environment and lead some to
stretch the rules of political warfare, by selling predetermined rankings, services, and
fellowship positions instead of leveraging sound ideas for shared social welfare.
Brookings provided a tiered system, a menu or rubric of what contributions would
purchase, like a private assessment, public validation, including titles at Brookings and
so on, which “read like a fee-for-service agreement” to potential donors (Lipton &
Williams, 2016). These activities blur the lines between credible think tanks in the
pursuit of truth and their more predatory cousins. This type of conflation seems more
systemic than the activities of a rogue researcher, and belies the tax-supported
accountability to the public. In this view, think tanks have abandoned the neutral
tendencies of eminent educators and publicly spirited citizens and replaced them with
predatory science.

Media landscape and the online giants
In The Imperial Presidency the founders “nourished”, Schlesinger writes, “the principle
of disclosure”, favoring the check that a widely informed public could provide an ailing
democracy. Walter Lippmann, in Public Opinion, explains that we inform ourselves
about politics from the media, and media evolves in its form, like the telegram, print,
radio, television, internet, and social media giving it mass, learning effects. With its
powers to inform the public and investigate, vital to democracy, the media is viewed as a
“fourth branch” of government, enshrined in the first amendment, yet existing outside
of government (Cater, 1959). Joseph Pulitzer once said “our Republic and its press will
rise or fall together” if only to show the interwoven nature of information to a publicspirited citizenry. However, regardless of the number of pages, air time, or screen size,
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the totality of bits of news in one day cannot be covered. Therefore, the news media have
not only an informative and educative role but an inherently propagandistic and
persuasive role; not only has information dissemination been democratized by the
internet but is also unprecedented in market concentration; not only has the media
expanded to provide up-to-the-minute and live updates but has reduced reporting to a
tweet or Facebook post, delivered via self-selection and programmatic algorithms —
sometimes at the request of Congress, the President, or agencies like the U.S. Census
Bureau (Brown, 2019).

On one hand, voluminous amounts of data distort credible information from the
incredible; rather, the problem is identifying actionable intelligence. On the other, name
recognition no longer requires the use of few, select pathways to the public. The internet
broadened the path to the public with a webpage; social media has further broadened
those pathways creating a networked society (Castells, 2009). President Trump, for
example, has a megaphone to over 67 million followers via his Twitter account, a
modern, 24-hour, fireside chat where the people can chat back. For example, “the
undisputed frontrunner in free mainstream coverage” was President Trump,
particularly with his use of old media in new ways (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 58). The
traditional Republican elite were sidestepped, no doubt in part by the nearly $2 billion
in free media coverage Trump received. In one study, Hillary Clinton, by comparison,
was mentioned half as often as Trump on CNN, MSNBC, CBS, and NBC Twitter
accounts.
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Twitter’s impact unfolds in real-time, as Ret. Rear Admiral John Kirby juxtaposes the
very real effects of “Twitter diplomacy” in the brinksmanship of US-Iran relations. It is
not unusual to use back channels and formal channels of communication, adding
Twitter as a third, “front channel” of communication for its public facing transparency
but also its real-time application by both President Trump and Iran’s foreign minister,
for example, de-escalating tensions after trading blows incited by U.S. aggression
(Kirby, 2020). This front channel of social media undercuts the temporal gap from
newsworthy event to print publication, and allows other policy actors (relatively)
unfiltered exposure to the public and donors.

According to Robert Hutchins, the concentration of media is “one of three factors
threatening freedom of the press” and with it the avenues to inform people of diverse
views (Baker, 2006). Five major conglomerates are horizontally and vertically
integrated controlling most of mainstream media. This is from fifty in 1983, twentythree in 1990, and ten in 1997 (Bagdikian, 2004). On the other hand, by comparison to
other industries in the economy it appears not as concentrated (Compaine & Gomery,
2000). The level of concentration is, in part, distorted by what industries are included,
for example, newspapers, magazines, film studios, radio, television networks, satellite
networks, software companies, and so on. One recent study put 80 percent of global
media revenue in the hands of ten firms (Winseck, 2011).

As a result of increasing concentration in the industry, corrupt market tactics, like
market power to control demand, reduce competition, and increase barriers to entry for
potential competitors are produced (Curran, 2002). In addition, the traditional
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protections between media and corporate advertisers withers, and news coverage is
adapted to protect other business holdings (Horwitz, 2005). Think tanks, therefore,
must establish relationships with fewer media outlets and be alert of potential harm to
other business holdings in order to reach the larger public, potential donors, and policy
makers; or they establish their own outlets and engage in the political conversation
before news cycles end and policy windows tighten, increasing the risk of more negligent
products.

While the internet ameliorates the gatekeeping concentration, social media may
exacerbate it. As a tool of information dissemination and thus a vital component to how
we orient ourselves in this world, the internet and social media can be used by optimists
to aid and stabilize liberal democracies (Shirky, 2008) or by skeptics as a tool to divide
them (Sunstein, 2017a). While Shirky praises the transition from one-to-many to manyto-many communication in new forms of media, Sunstein argues social media
algorithms aided by your input construct a “daily me” newsfeed, heightening
polarization with digital echo chambers that nudge users in ways most people are
unaware of.

Social media is also characterized by concentration. Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft,
and Amazon have a combined revenue stream of $800 billion, rivaling the GDP of major
nations. As conglomerates in monosopnistic positions, Amazon captures one of every
two dollars spent online for example. More specifically in the news, 93 percent of
Americans get their news online, and two-thirds of Americans use social media for news
(Lynn, 2018). The average American spends roughly 12 hours a day with media; in 1960
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it was 5 hours. This attracts the ad dollars. The Internet Advertising Bureau show 99
percent of all new advertising dollars is acquired by Google and Facebook (Ingram,
2017), a pair that nearly possess 60 percent of all digital advertising. Google and
Facebook’s annual profits from advertising rose, reaching $96 and $55 billion
respectively (Desjardins, 2019), at the same time newspaper revenue has fallen from
$50 billion in 2005 to less than $20 billion. A news desert now prevails across the
country despite a plethora of websites because the journalistic food chain begins with
the papers. And 2000 of the 3143 U.S. counties no longer receive a daily newspaper
according to Knight chair in journalism and media economics at UNC, Penelope
Abernathy (Stites, 2018); Pittsburgh recently became the first mid-sized city without
one. Now, Google and Facebook are responsible for 48 percent of ad revenue in local
markets—this lead former FCC director Tom Wheeler to argue Facebook knows more
about local customers than local businesses (The Current, a Brookings Podcast,
5.10.2019). Twitter, more specifically, surpassed Facebook in 2017 with a higher
percentage of users who use the platform as a source of news (Shearer & Gottfried,
2017). While Facebook’s scale means more Americans still receive their news on its
platform, the surge in news activity is on Twitter’s platform.

The distinction between propaganda and education in news is worth considering. Media
can be both. Propaganda has evolved from a nationalistic conception used in the
disinformation campaigns of World War I, to a more individualistic one, both relying on
asymmetries of information (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2002). Communication used to
persuade the recipient is deemed propaganda, while that which is to inform and allow
the recipient to exercise critical judgement and may conclude with contrary opinions is
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education. At the same time, importantly, not all persuasion is propaganda. Therefore,
think tanks more interested in policy-based evidence than evidenced-based policy
become propagandistic.

The debate between propaganda and education revolves around freedom of choice but
the persuasive aspect cannot be wholly removed, even from the most well-intentioned
expert. From the supply-side, if an editor tried to submit no influence at all nudging is
still inevitable. Unforeseen influence will occur. Moreover, when print media attempt to
use opposing scholarly views in order to appear non- or bi-partisan, they foster the
perception of an even debate that is not always evenhanded nor itself free from bias. The
increasing references to partisan think tanks increase both proportionally, educative
research as well as propaganda, according to a pair of RAND scholars (Kavanagh &
Rich, 2018). The media, therefore, is not above scrutiny in a liberal democracy, nor
entirely educative. The asymmetry of information in the news is the first sign of
propaganda, Lippmann (1922/1998) argues:

In order to conduct propaganda there must be some barrier between the public
and the event. Access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone
can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable. For while
people who have direct access can misconceive what they see, no one else can
decide how they shall misconceive it, unless he can decide where they shall look,
and at what.
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This was a useful tool, according to Lippmann (1922/1998, pp. 248, 310) the “common
interests very largely elude public opinion” such that a “specialized class” of responsible
experts must “manufacture consent.” Harold Lasswell (1933), for his part, agreed with
the more propagandistic function of the media.

The new forms of media permit similar barriers, and create enhanced opportunities for
political and economic predictions. Harvard business professor emeritus Shoshana
Zuboff states, “asymmetries of knowledge and power are essential to the means of
behavioral modification.” Online Giants restructure how information is shared and
revolutionize the market, argues Zuboff (2019), such that the “war of extraction” has
commenced. In other words, you’ve ceased to be the customer and you’re no longer the
product; you are the mine. Whomever can render the most information (by keeping the
attention of users) to effectively nudge and predict human activity in a “behavioral
futures market” will reign. Aided by the internet of things and constant connectivity,
these newly dubbed “surveillance capitalists” are liquefying the physical world,
according to an IBM report (Lougee & Pureswaran, 2015). Meanwhile, the implications
of seemingly addictive social media use are only beginning to be understood (Alter,
2017). More politicized think tanks often produce captivating material framed in a
pseudo-environment, particularly in order to be prioritized in social media’s algorithmic
news feeds that relies on timely, sensational products.9 In addition, the preponderance

9

Though, in April of 2019, there is some research that allege algorithms have been reprogrammed to
direct viewers’ recommended news feed — 70% of youtube viewing time is from recommended
videos — to more general-interest clips in corporate media, like MSNBC, CNN, and especially FOX
(Ledwich, 2019)(Pakman, 2019).
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of live news accounts and cycles put pressure on think tanks to engage while the iron is
still hot, with politicizing results.

The role of the media from the supply-side argument is a predictive role. This prophetic
power influences the agenda of the political process. It is the strategy of influencing the
agenda that compels think tanks to engage, heavily by some, with the media in all its
forms. Walter Lippmann states how the media predicts the economy, potentially
creating self-fulfilling prophecies. This has certainly shown to be true for IPO share
prices (Pollock & Rindova, 2003); and true in education where a paltry 1.4 percent of
national media coverage leads to an equally dismal level of public understanding in
education policy and issues (West, Whitehurst, & Dionne Jr., 2009). In another study
using frequency of articles, five pieces per month on inflation and eleven per month on
unemployment boost public concern by one percent. This acknowledges the agendasetting function, particularly as it influences independents and the politically uninvolved
the most (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).

Public opinion of representatives, which think tanks wish to influence, is particularly
impressionable to such media lobbying; as McCombs (2004) notes, “there is
considerable evidence that the shifting salience of issues on the media agenda often are
the basis for public opinion about the overall performance in office of a public leader.”
Think tanks, in this view, seek to tap into these political streams to steer the narrative
where possible.
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While Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940s and 50s made convincing arguments regarding the
“minimal effects” of the media on public opinion, a polarized media has been shown to
lead to a more polar nation, with major effects (Zaller, 1992). Though partisan media
finds fewer but more politically knowledgeable viewers, extreme programming produces
more extreme beliefs (Levendusky, 2013). And yet, much of the extreme still makes its
way to the mainstream. Partisan voices on cable networks like MSNBC and Fox may still
have significantly less viewership than their mainstream cousins, but they receive
significantly more discussion in print and other outlets for their extreme claims,
especially high-profile conservatives like Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity (Taylor, 2017).

One study from the 2008 election on viewers of partisan news outlets (MSNBC and
FOX) reveals significant effects on viewer attitudes towards the oppositional candidate
(Smith & Searles, 2014). Another study finds from 1996 to 2000 — when Rupert
Murdoch established the twenty-four-hour Fox News Channel — towns which broadcast
Fox News saw an increase of Republican vote share (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007).

A critical view seems to be in demand for either party. For Carter and Reagan in 1980,
25 percent of presidential campaign news coverage was negative. However, by 2000, the
negative coverage surpassed 60 percent, paralleling a lack of trust in politicians and
government over the same time (Schudson, 2003). In Schudson‘s view, increasingly
critical coverage has at least led to a more cynical public.

In meta-analyses on the relationship between news media exposure and voting,
researchers found a strong relationship between newspaper reading and voting
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(Hollander, 2007). However, this is less generalized with TV (Miron & Bryant, 2007). Of
course, on the whole, research would be better served if the media’s agenda and public’s
agenda could be untethered but this is difficult with regards to data.

A recent European study has shown in four parliamentary states “the mass media to be
one of the key political agenda setters directly competing with the Prime Minister and
the powerful political parties” (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011, p. 295). It is in this regard
that the fourth branch fulfills its namesake.

Another key factor associated with higher degrees of media visibility relates to the
“personal networks and editorial judgments (or biases) of newspaper reporters and
editors.” In this case, proximity again plays an important role by making it easier to build
networks that link social scientists, journalists, and policymakers’ staffs. As they do in
obtaining funding, conservative think tanks appear to fare better in obtaining mentions in
the media, being cited nearly one and half times as frequently as those with no discernible
ideology (Rich, 2004). The Washington Times and Wall Street Journal were found to
favor conservative think tanks, whereas the New York Times was more likely to mention
think tanks with no discernible ideology, “even after controlling for budget size.”

Using regression analysis, Rich and Weaver (2000) examine the factors that are related to
media visibility within a sample of 51 public policy think tanks in six national newspapers
from 1991 to 1998. One key factor is, unsurprisingly, funding: well-funded think tanks
excel at gaining visibility and spreading their ideas, which, in turn, “attracts additional
funding,” creating a cyclical effect. Another study by Abelson (2002) corroborates the
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correlations between funding and visibility by examining television appearances by thinktank scholars on ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN; well-resourced think tanks like Brookings,
CEIP, AEI, and Heritage had the most evening news citations, the study found.

Social media’s newfound predictive power using unforeseen barriers is just being
explored. An article in Nature argues Facebook was able to nudge 340,000 voters into
action on election day in 2010, 60,000 from one group with an informative message
about election day and 280,000 from a second group with the message and portraits of
six friends who voted, revealing the “contagion effect” (Bond, et al., 2012). But there are
many new tools to predict behavior through the use of pseudo-environments. On
election day in 2018, Google implemented a campaign of vote manipulation against
Republicans using several tools like the “Search Engine Manipulation Effect”, argues
Epstein (2019) in a Senate Judiciary hearing. Moreover, under such algorithmic
manipulations and self-selective echo chambers, a “false consensus” pervades the public
leaving the user with the erroneous perception of an idea held widely across the polity,
giving it misplaced weight and greater impetus than what is actual (Wiesner, et al.,
2018).

Think tanks may have an active presence with Online Giants but these giants are also
active in think tanks. Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, for example, became directly
engaged when in 2013 he became chairman of the board at New America alongside a
one-million-dollar donation in the same year. Other million dollar donations came from
the U.S. Government via the State department, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
and the Lumina Foundation; Google was in the next tier of donors (over $500,000).
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Schmidt would eventually step down from New America in 2016 after seventeen years
on the board.

With Larry Page at the helm of Google after Schmidt’s departure in 2011, Google began
to fund conservative and anti-statist think tanks that seek to diminish the role of
government. The Center for Democracy and Media’s investigative report, “the
Googlization of the Far Right” listed the recipients, including ALEC, Cato Institute,
Federalist Society, Americans for Tax Reform, and Heritage Action (Surgey, 2013).
Importantly, this information is a voluntary submission as corporate disclosure of
donations to the public is not mandatory and may be in line with Google’s motto at the
time of “don’t be evil” but at the same time it is estimated that more than $33 billion
dollars is kept offshore, avoiding taxes (U.S. PIRG, 2013). On the other hand, in action
Google appears to lean to the left in a study over a ten-day span prior to (and including)
the 2018 November election, leading researchers to allege manipulation from the first
keystroke (Epstein & Williams, 2019).

Facebook too has found cause to support, and seek expertise from, think tanks. In what
has been called an “election partnership,” Facebook has invested with the Atlantic
Council, a think tank which focuses on international affairs, defense, and military
analysis in support of NATO members. In this case, ostensibly, the partnership is out of
concern for election tampering on Facebook’s platform (Harbath, 2018).

Levitsky and Ziblatt contend Republican leadership structure is eviscerated by
influential right-wing media; but conservatives are not alone (Persily, 2017). The new
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media landscape creates windows of opportunity for the healthy democratization of
information, and also framed analysis and propaganda. This evolving media landscape
is navigated, and its prophetic power exploited, by think tanks, often creating negligent
products at the expense of rigor. With the aid of clandestine social media algorithms, the
dominant Online Giants have become covert gatekeepers to the public at large, putting a
caveat on Castells networked society with the uncertainty of private algorithms. The
activity of think tanks in this medium is, therefore, worth adding for analysis.

Acting swiftly
Meanwhile, as the complexity of policy making expands to match the global scale, the
pressure to respond with sensational alacrity in the news cycle wedges think tanks into a
position of negligence, relying on habits, assumptions, heuristics, and patterns of
behavior, increasing the likelihood of bias (Schudson, 2003).

Think tanks that wish to make the news cycle risk being negligent in their sensational
claims such as in the Khashoggi scenario, distancing them from a more rigorous
standard. Similarly, the Heritage Foundation produces ‘bulletins’ and ‘backgrounders’ in
one or two months by the hundreds but was capable of surfacing them on pressing
matters within days (Ricci, 1993). Flash reports, policy memos, and non-reviewed
journals have become more common in the fast-paced, results-oriented political
landscape (Weaver, 1989) As producers of flash reporting with reduced review, think
tanks too have become result-oriented in the short-term at the expense of the long-term
or medium-term.
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Peer review and academic discussion was sacrificed in order to enter radical ideas in
policy debates. Soley (1992) reports that the academic journals from partisan think
tanks lack the peer review process that give other journals their veneration. The
production of conservative journals with names similar to legitimate journals is
intentional, Soley argues, Public Opinion by AEI is not the admired Public Opinion
Quarterly; the Heritage Foundation’s Policy Review is not to be confused with Policy
Sciences published by Springer for the Society of Policy Scientists, a nonprofit inspired
by Harold Lasswell.

On the other hand, this timely advice cemented a new bridge between politics and
expertise and helped breach the iron triangles of the past. In addition, McGann (2016, p.
167) states new media forms are “redefining how think tanks operate”, more specifically
that information comes at the “right time.” The desired speed at which reports should be
made is further met with the aforementioned television and radio stations, podcasts,
and Twitter accounts.

Negligence is also at hand when Emily Tisch Sussman, credentialed as former vicepresident of campaigns for the Center for American Progress, comes on MSNBC in
strong support of presidential candidate Warren for 2020 when compared to Sanders:
“to vote for Sanders over Warren is sexist”, Sussman (2019) alleges, because Warren has
more detailed plans and her plans have evolved, meaning changed. Though they framed
Sussman as a political strategist from CAP, she is also the heiress to real estate
billionaire Laurie Tisch and daughter to Donald Sussman, founder of Paloma Funds,
and Warren’s wealth tax puts less burden on the wealthy. Moreover, the evidence of
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sexism appears lacking in the brevity of a television critique. In this case, the time and
space create a pseudo-environment that allows for a more propagandistic message,
neither fake nor rigorously produced. The modern corollary is, for example, Twitter
where the creator has more autonomy over the framing and message, without having to
step through corporate media’s gate.
Meanwhile, the “slow” perspective encourages “us to challenge our assumptions about
media choices, to look beyond celerity, and to imagine alternatives that enhance both
sustainability and free will” (Rauch, 2018, p. 125). As opposed to being lazy, slow, or a
return to lost better times, the perspective dictates a more focused and mindful
approach to media use, but also as an approach for experts and scholars in academia.
While globalization, policies, and everyday life make actions more complex and
impactful, the imperative for experts is to increase their response time under such
urgency. When often the best course of action involves a return to the present in a
meaningful way, with care and attention (Berg & Seeber, 2016), while studies show
academics (78%) are burdened by physical and mental stress at higher rates than the
general population “no matter how hard they work, they can’t get everything done”,
including CEOs (48%).

Predators, partisans, and the principles
Think tanks subject to the pressures of the political landscape risk becoming more
predatory in order to attract donors or support prejudices, and think tanks subject to the
pressures in the media landscape risk becoming more negligent from swift policy
windows, pressuring experts to rely on habits and heuristics. Predatory and negligent
think tanks have abandoned the purpose of science and central tenet of enlightened
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thinking: consensus building in a rigorous pursuit of truth, discerning better ideas from
worse.

The tendency to capitalize on science was forewarned by De Solla Price (1963) in Big
Science, Little Science, where science, brimming from industrialization, expands and
grows, eventually saturating the scientific market. After government and corporate
funding dries up, a crisis of quality would ensue. More blame should be placed for the
crisis of legitimacy in science on the experts themselves, according to Sarewitz (2000),
because of a surplus of information on either side of a debate, as if to cancel one another
out — a surfeit of expertise. Ravetz (1971) suggests an epistemological issue where
science is relied on too heavily as a form of knowing, when he warns of the “folk science”
of the educated classes, “derived from 17th century revolution in philosophy…a basic
faith in the methods and results in the successful natural sciences, as a means to the
solution of the deepest practical problems” (p.387). The emergent experts are, then,
heavily capitalized. The privatization and commodification of social sciences, has regeared the practice into tools, intellectual-backed content in the knowledge economy to
the highest bidder (Mirowski, 2011). Thus, not only think tanks but science generally as
a trusted and credible field suffers and simultaneously struggles to pivot outward to
innovative solutions.

The track record of expert prognostication puts quality in high demand. Experts’ ability
to read the situation and forecast from the social sciences is significant only in its
insignificance next to Jane Q. Public (Tetlock, 2005). In 2010, for example, Nobel prize
winner Robert Solow is on record in a rare congressional hearing on such economic
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failures, specifically on dynamic stochastic general models and how these economic
tools were failures in predicting the Great Recession (Mirowski, 2011). Likewise,
political scientists suffer similar shortcomings of theory and practice. Green and Shapiro
(1994) state after reviewing rational choice theories from the most “formidable” and
“widely-regarded” literatures built on Arrow, Downs, and Olson:

literatures on voter turnout, collective action, legislative behavior, and electoral
competition reveal that the empirical contributions of rational choice theory in
these fields are few, far between, and considerably more modest than the
combination of mystique and methodological fanfare surrounding the rational
choice movement would lead one to expect” (p.179).

Frederick Hayek, founder of the modern neoliberal thought collective, in his 1974
memorial Nobel Prize in Economics acceptance speech, decried the objectivity claimed
in economics as “scientistic”, due to inescapable uncertainty (Hayek, 1974). Hayek
shared the Nobel prize with economist Gunnar Myrdal who despite ideological
differences as the only NPW who advocated for Social Democracy also shared his
caution of the veracity of science based on the whims of human behavior (Offer &
Söderberg, 2016). Their concerted warning supplants perfectly to policy problems,
which are inherently “wicked” to solve (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Science is no more than
a special kind of social arrangement to understand the world around us and come to a
rational consensus, followed by two overarching concerns, according to Daniel Bell
(1973): will there be a rationalization of science, a policy for science? And will scientists
be on top or on tap?
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Philip Tetlock fears the marketplace of ideas is imperfect, without intervention, for
political judgement and prognostication for at least three reasons. First, competition is
futile if consumers are unmotivated to make critical judgement, leading to reliance on
low-effort heuristics. Second, consumers may have the “wrong” motives. In other words,
consumers are looking to bolster their prejudices as opposed to a “dispassionate pursuit
of truth.” Like-minded consumers adopt in-group mentality similar to distinguishing
teams as in a “sports arena” instead of the meeting room. Lastly, there are “cognitive”
and “task difficulty” constraints on even the motivated consumer. Partisans may offer
any number of vague counterfactuals to a better outcome that at the end of the day
cannot be falsified. These imperfections give a wide berth to think tanks. These
conditions are impacted by the political landscape and media landscape I have
described above. It will help us to understand the impacts by placing think tanks on a
grid with two axes. The political landscape exerts pressure on think tanks, compelling
them toward either predatory behavior on the one hand and principled on the other.
Similarly, the media landscape compels think tanks to either negligent behavior on one
hand and rigorous methods on the other (see Figure 5).
Figure 3. 3: A visual of the pressures from the political and media
landscape
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Non-peer-reviewed content can impart negligence due to hasty attempts to enter the
political debate, or predation from advocacy-led support to prejudices, particularly
when found in think tank leaders. Edwin Feulner, Jr. was unpublished in any of the
1,000 social science journals after 25 years despite his founding and status as president
of the Heritage Foundation, according to Soley (1992). Nor had the director of research,
Burton Yale Pines, or the “Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies” Dr. Leon Aron. In Soley’s
research from 1976-1980 the only academic publication from Heritage is a letter to a
journal editor. For Heritage, credibility followed its proximity to power in the Reagan
administration, highlighting an alternative path to policy success. Perhaps worse, then,
is the extent to which reviewed content can be trusted.

From the extreme actions of predatory journals, well-intentioned experts may simply
utilize poor principles or rigor. A journal editor’s ability to catch errors is not wholly
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reassuring, for instance. Smaldino and McElreath (2016) argue the allure of bold,
creative contributions over replication studies may increase the frequency of publishing
fallacious results. Moreover, principled experts diving into their field run the risk of
hitting these academic pitfalls. As research in the communication of science shows, trust
in science and knowledge are not tethered; on the contrary, becoming an expert in a
topic can lead to increased skepticism regarding scientific claims (Simis, Madden,
Cacciatore, & Yeo, 2016).

Science of Doubt
Ioannidis (2014), of the Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford, estimates 85% of
research resources are wasted because of exaggerated or false findings—which should be
alarming considering the billions committed to research from public and private
funding. This is particularly true in fields “that have to-date been too lenient”, he argues,
like epidemiology, psychology (Simmons JP, 2011), or economics (Stiglitz, 2010).
Moreover, the replication failures in science are well documented in psychology and
particularly in the failures of economics (Nuzzo, 2016). Principled science, at minimum,
must be gauged in quality, which after review includes empirical tests. After all, hopes of
agreement aside, who is expert enough to know the future? Yet it is the future that must
be judged, comparing one policy to another, tolerating less than perfect knowledge.

Peer review is an information check for the public but also for other experts trying to
filter the credible from the incredible. Retractionwatch.com keeps a running catalogue
of articles pulled by publishers. Sage Publishing, for example, pulled 22 articles in midSeptember from their International Journal of Damage Mechanics and Journal of
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Composite Materials. Retractiondatabase.org, a sister website, maintains a catalogue of
retractions, open to the public. In 2000, thirty out of one million journal articles across
disciplines were retracted, but in 2016 there were over 1300 out of nearly two million
articles retracted. In other words, at the same time total articles published double, the
number of retractions ascend forty-fold (Oransky, 2017). When it comes to the
retraction leaderboard, it is clear men are far guiltier of fraud than women. When it
comes to impact factor, other issues with the factor aside, the higher the impact factor
the higher the number of retractions. And then notifying the public is troublesome,
“journals often fail to alert the naïve reader; 31.8% of retracted papers were not noted as
retracted in any way” (Steen, 2011).

Brian Nosek of UVA was part of the “Reproducibility Project” published in Science
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), in which scholars replicated 100 psychology
experiments, 97 of which have significant results. The repeated experiments, in turn,
found only 36 experiments with significant results leading one scholar to comment “if
36 percent of replications are getting statistically significant results, it is not at all clear
what the number should be” (Yong, 2015). This is not to say “evidence-based policy” is
fundamentally unobtainable but, rather, “policy-based evidence” and statistical errors
have made the predicament of science grave (Benessia, et al., 2016). Moreover, as sound
bites and tweets take precedent as a sources of news, how will think tanks counterbalance the short-term nature that incentivizes “policy-based evidence?”

Agencies with hopes of bringing principles to science have since been created but are
few. The reproducibilityinitiative.org aims to identify and reward principled science
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with “independently validated” badges. However, access to data can be hard at times
(Van Noorden, 2015).

Building a consensus, in part, means bringing in those from without. Women, for
example, occupy less than 15 percent of the leadership role in think tanks, and Women’s
research in think tanks is less read and circulated on Twitter (Manzano & SanchezGiménez, 2019). This indicates that the scholarly interests of women are not being
addressed equally. The media hastens the opening and closing of policy windows which
is why a slow approach to fast media has been beckoning (Rauch, 2018, p. 33). Some
media outlets like Delayed Gratification specifically avoid the story of the day,
preferring to let the dust settle and report more comprehensively and rigorously on the
news of the past quarter. In this way, “delayed news becomes an asset, not an
oxymoron.” While not all policy situations will allow for such luxuries, it is important to
avoid negligent mistakes in the media for the more rigorous standards science demands.

Public opinion, meanwhile, reveals a slight uptick in the role experts should play in
policy debates over the past four years but is much stronger in those with high science
knowledge and among Democrats (Funk, Hefferon, Kennedy, & Johnson, 2019).
Republicans see expert decisions as no better than the average person 66 percent of the
time, while 45 percent of Democrats feel the same. Going further Republicans believe
the scientific method produces accurate conclusions 55 percent of the time, whereas 70
percent of Democrats trust the scientific method. What is pivotal to public trust in
experts is whether the data is open to the public, or funded by industry.
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CH. 4 Methodology
Using publicly accessible tax, media, and congressional data, this proposed study assesses
the extent to which media visibility and political partisanship explain the influence of elite
modern think tanks. First, I identify which think tanks are the authorities, the experts as
policy makers see them, as measured by interactions with policymakers (e.g., requests to
testify at congressional committees) (Abelson, 2002; Rich & Weaver, 2000). I then use
DW-Nominate scores of legislators in the 115th Congress to calculate partisanship scores
for the think tanks in my sample, adapted from Groseclose and Milyo (2005). Finally, I
perform multiple regression analysis to assess to what extent this first measure of
authority is associated with think-tank media exposure (e.g., mentions in major news
sources, social media metrics, industry surveys) and political partisanship.

Quantitative Analyses
Sample
My nonprobability sample of think tanks is purposefully selected by identifying the think
tanks most frequently invited to give testimonies and in the literature (see Table 4.1). In
addition, relying on the extensive work done by James McGann, I will add a few think
tanks to create an evenly distributed sample by partisanship. For the past ten years,
McGann has conducted an annual ranking of the top think tanks in the U.S., one that is
widely used by scholars as well as organizations like thinktankwatch.com. McGann’s
method involves surveys of thousands of institutions and scholars in which respondents
rank think tanks based on a wide range of criteria. While some scholars (e.g., Shoup,
2015) disagree with McGann’s conclusions about the “top” think tanks, the GGTTI
provides me with a list of think tanks that will supplement my sample for other kinds of
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assessments—specifically, measures of political authority by congressional testimony,
media visibility by mentions in selected news outlets, and political partisanship by policy
positions.
Table 4. 1: Sample of Think Tanks
Think Tank
American Enterprise Institute
Heritage Foundation
Atlantic Council
Hoover Institution
Baker Institute
Hudson Institute
Belfer Center
Human Rights Watch
Brookings Institution
Institute for New Economic Thinking
Center for American Progress
Institute for Policy Studies
Cato Institute
Manhattan Institute
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
Mercatus Center
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
National Bureau of Economic Research
Center for Economic and Policy Research
New America
Century Foundation
Open Markets Institute
Council on Foreign Relations
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Center for a New American Security
RAND Corporation
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Resources for the Future
Economic Policy Institute
Stimson Center
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Urban Institute
Freedom House
Washington Center for Equitable Growth
Woodrow Wilson Center

Time dimension
The time dimension for this study is framed around the 115th Congresses (2017-2019).
Validity issues include the differences in congressional activity during a lame-duck
presidency versus during a new administration. As Light (1999) explains, the beginning of
presidencies prove to be more productive despite inexperience, particularly with major
reform (for example, Obama and health care or Trump and tax reform). Also, it should be
noted that the Republican Party held majorities in both houses of Congress during this
time period. This will have important implications for the findings as the majority party
determines the congressional schedule.
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Think tank congressional testimonies (policy authority)
The number of times that scholars from each think tank appear before congressional
committees will be used as a measure of each think tank’s degree of authority as seen by
policymakers. Trimbath (2005) considers congressional testimonies to be the most direct
way to assess influence: the agenda is influenced by the people who deliver testimony and
ideas, fulfilling policymakers’ needs for more specialized information. I will focus on
appearances in hearings in the Senate and House. By comparison, Abelson (2006) focuses
on the war in Iraq and the committees responsible for foreign and defense policy and
thus, the testimony made in them between 2001-2006.

It is important to note that think tanks are able to exert influence in many ways other than
testifying before Congress (Monbiot, 2011; Silverstein & Williams, 2013). Other methods
include: holding public forums, conferences, and lectures; publishing books, articles,
policy briefs, and journals; and using digital outlets like webpages, podcasts, and social
media platforms to increase media exposure. Think tanks also engage in more private
methods of influencing policy, such as serving on advisory boards, preparing studies for
policymakers, and inviting policymakers to conferences. One of the most discreet but
potent ways that think tanks shape policy involves what is commonly known as the
“revolving door” (McGann, 2016)—when think tanks scholars accept government
positions, or think tanks provide positions to former government officials.10 Medvetz’s

10

Brookings Institution Press was asked by this author to provide an appendix mentioned in
McGann’s (2016) The Fifth Estate. Its contents include data on the revolving door between think
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unique interstitial field of think tanks is, perhaps, most epitomized through the use of the
revolving door; indeed, policy influence may be at its zenith when think tank scholars
become policymakers.

While these other forms of policy authority, or influence, are very real, they are often
difficult to measure. Abelson (2006), Rich (2004), and Trimbath (2005) all use
congressional testimonials as a direct indicator of policy influence and relevance. The
approach taken in this study will follow Abelson (2006). Abelson tallies appearances
before congressional think tanks by using materials from CQ Roll Call, the Library of
Congress, and the U.S. Government Publishing Office. I will use the same data sources to
determine the number of times personnel from those think tanks in the sample (as
described above) testify before Congressional hearings in each year between 2017 and
2019 (115th Congress). This will generate a measure of think tank congressional
testimonies (see figure 4.1).
Think tank media visibility (X2)
Rich and Weaver (2000) make the case that “the most readily available measure” of think
tank media visibility is a tally of the number of institutional mentions in major news
publications selected for their national circulation or being based in the nation’s capital.
Specifically, they are the Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, and USA Today. Rich (2004), later,

tanks and government but is unavailable. Future copies of the text are to include an errata slip as
McGann stated “any mention of this appendix should have been removed.”
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confines this sample to the Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal.
Both studies utilized this approach over a six-year period from 1991 to 1998. In a similar
study of Canadian think tanks, Abelson (2002) added broadcast and radio media citations
(CBC radio and CTV and CBC evening news).
Figure 4. 1: Path Analysis of Project

There are at least three limitations to this method that will favor existing relationships
between publishers and think tanks. A journalist may reuse “sources of choice” out of
efficiency as opposed to fostering new and diverse relationships. Geographically speaking,
some institutions may cross paths with local news agencies more so than those, for
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example, on the opposite coast. Lastly, some articles will mention a subject’s prior
affiliations even though they are no longer formally connected with the institution.
Despite these limitations, measuring think tank mentions in major media outlets gives us
some sense of which think tanks are the most successful at disseminating their research
via the mainstream media. I will calculate think tank news media visibility by
determining the number of news articles that use think tank personnel as sources,
including as authors of articles, references to academic studies, and references to
academic commentary. The sample will include all articles published between 2015 and
2017 in three prominent national newspapers—the New York Times, Washington Post,
and Wall Street Journal. As Cook (1989, p. 48) states by citing a network correspondent,
one starts the day by reading [these] newspapers in order to “start out with an idea of the
story of the day.” Tallies of media citations will exclude display ads, classified ads, stock
quotes, and obituaries. These publications are chosen following Rich (2004). Moreover,
while TV and Radio have certainly become more prominent in the dissemination of news
with twenty-four-hour a day service, quantifying citations is complicated by the scattered
context, the tendency to shift from topic to topic when stories over 120 seconds is
considered “long” in TV and nearly outright long in Radio (Bagdikian, 2004, p. 120).

This measure of media visibility cannot determine if such media references are actually
consumed by members of Congress. Furthermore, in today’s media landscape, consumers
of political news in general are more likely to find it through television and social media
outlets rather than print publications. The decline of print readership is clear: in 1930
daily newspaper circulation averaged 1.3 newspapers per household; by 1970, the
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circulation rate dropped to 1, and by 2003, the rate had fallen further to .5 (Sunstein,
2017a). The internet and social media platforms in particular are increasingly used for
political news (Lynn, 2018).

To account for these trends, I will also tally think tank use of one prominent social media
platform—Twitter with nearly 50 million monthly users in the US (Clement, 2019)—in
terms of each organization’s number of tweets, retweets, “likes” their tweets receive, and
the number of followers their accounts have. The analysis will encompass Twitter activity
in the 115th Congress. The resulting measure will allow me to assess think tank social
media visibility for each think tank in my sample. Kleinberg (1999) argues the more
hyperlinks the greater the source credibility of that information. Social media simplified
this action with “retweets.” But it was the incursion of the “like” button, introduced in
2009, that became a massive source of behavioral data extraction, Zuboff (2019) argues.
And ‘likes’ are coveted by think tanks. Zero ‘likes’ are not just “privately painful, but also a
kind of public condemnation” (Alter, 2017). Here, it is important to note that the number
of posts, retweets, or followers does not necessarily correspond to a given think tank’s
object authority with readers, nor do the number of likes, or retweets, its posts receive
indicate what is actually favorably viewed—the organization or the idea, for example.
Regressing policy authority on media visibility (X3 as a function of X2)
Once these two measures of think tank media visibility have been calculated for all think
tanks in my sample, I will analyze the relationship between these independent variables
and my measure of policy authority, think tank congressional testimonies. I will first
assess the direction and strength of the relationship by calculating a correlation
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coefficient. I will then use a hierarchical linear model, or random effects, generalized least
squares regression. A random effects model assumes that there is natural heterogeneity
across subjects in their regression coefficients, which can be represented as a probability
(Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, & Zeger, 2002). However, the difference in strength between ten
media citations and one hundred is unclear. I will then rank the variables to account for
this unknown disparity, and use Spearman’s rho—a statistical test used to show the
correlation among two sets of ranked variables—to assess the relationship between media
visibility and congressional testimonies.

Regressing policy authority on political partisanship (X3 as a function of X1)
Similar to above, when political partisanship has been determined for each think tank in
my sample, I will analyze the relationship between my measure, political partisanship,
and my measure of policy authority, think tank congressional testimonies.
I will likewise, assess the direction and strength of the relationship with a correlation
coefficient. Then, I will determine the size and effect of the relationship with
hierarchical linear model, random effects regression.

Political partisanship (X2)
Building upon the work of scholars who have examined partisanship within political
parties (Hacker & Pierson, 2005), I will create a measure of think-tank partisanship and
determine its values, and their changes over time, for the think tanks in my sample. This
analysis presumes all think tanks have an ideology, and will follow the spectrum used by
Lewis, et al., (2019) in the creation of DW-Nominate ideology scores. (By comparison,
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Rich and Weaver (2000) utilize a three-level Likert scale for ideology—namely,
conservative, non-identifiable, and liberal; “non-identifiable” think tanks were defined as
such because their politics were apparently balanced, indiscernible, or uneasily placed in a
left-right spectrum.)

There are several variables to be considered in my sample of think tanks with regards to
media visibility: partisanship, geographic location, age of institution, size (or budget),
staff size (closely related to budget), and interlocks with congressional and other
government service (a measure of the “revolving door” phenomenon discussed earlier).

Measuring think tank partisanship can be difficult, given that IRS tax law stipulates
nonprofits remain nonpartisan or risk losing their classification. As a result, most think
tanks are not forthright about their prevailing ideologies, but some are. Some self-identify
in their mission statements and other published materials. Past court decisions have
mandated that think tanks limit their attempts to influence legislation to less than five
percent of their budgets so that their political involvement remains “insubstantial” and
they can keep their tax-exempt status (Rich, 2004, p.18).

Location
Having an address within the beltway is helpful when increasing media visibility.
Washington-based think tanks receive 1.93 times the number of citations that nonWashington-based think tanks receive for every million dollars in revenue (Rich &
Weaver, 2000). No other variable was found to be as significant in Rich and Weaver’s
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analysis, which includes state-focused as well as nationally-focused media publications.
Being close to policymakers facilitates such personal relationships, for example, that are
important “between experts and politicians” and a “core dynamic in the politics of
expertise” (Bimber, 1996, p. 5).
Age
The age of an institution also matters, given that relationships with journalists require
time to grow. In order to provide a more proportional classification of the significance of
age, the fourth root of the think tank’s age in years will be used in this analysis. For
example, a sixteen-year-old think tank may be expected to have twice the visibility as a
one-year-old think tank; an eighty-one-year-old think tank is expected to have three times
the visibility of a one-year-old think tank.

Size
In addition, differences in budget should be accounted for, particularly in the present
context of heightened competition for revenue. For example, the Heritage Foundation
alone has a budget larger than the entire “liberal cluster” of think tanks, which includes
the Economic Policy Institute (Rich and Weaver 2000). In order to account for such
disparities, an organization’s number of citations will be divided by its budget in a given
year and reported as citations per one million dollars (thus following Rich and Weaver’s
method).
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Conclusion
Scholarly study of think tanks is more important than ever. Claims of non-partisanship
have become more problematic for modern think tanks; even as certain elite think tanks
have come to dominate the industry. The rise of new media platforms provides think
tanks with new means of influencing policymakers via their messaging, even as partisan
foundations and other funders have pushed their favored think tanks toward more
results-oriented approaches in their research. This proposed research study will help fill
in gaps in our knowledge of modern think tanks by examining the intersection of various
factors relating to think tank influence, media visibility, and political partisanship.
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Ch.5 RESULTS
I first present partisanship scores for select think tanks (n = 19), along with other
descriptive statistics. I then provide Pearson correlations among the variables to provide
an overall portrait of the direction and strength of relationships. It is worth
remembering that Human Rights Watch was omitted as an outlier – if it were included,
nearly 50 percent of Twitter followers in my sample would be attributed to Human
Rights Watch alone. From these data, I construct a hierarchical regression model that
will be used to predict the likelihood of appearing before Congress.

Descriptive statistics
Partisanship. Partisanship scores were derived by examining each congressional record
that mentions a nonprofit think tank in my sample. I identified 825 such records, which
I coded as criticism, support, or activity. For the most part, these designations were
straightforward. When mentioning think tanks, members of Congress were usually clear
whether they were using such expert authority to support their arguments. For example,
the following two examples were coded as “support”: remarks that Senator Tom Carper
(D) from Delaware made on July 27, 2017, regarding the Heritage Foundation and the
Affordable Care Act (“It is probably heresy, as a Democrat, to say this, but it was a good
idea”); and (2) remarks that Republican member of the House from Arizona, David
Schweikert, made about an Urban Institute analysis of deficits from FICA taxes and
Medicare costs (“This slide isn’t from some conservative group. I believe it is from the
Urban Institute. This is just reality”).
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I excluded mentions coded as criticism or activity from my analysis because my study
sought to determine where the views of political leaders coincide with those of think
tanks. Criticisms occurred when members of Congress attacked the research or
statements of think tanks as inaccurate, partisan, or otherwise illegitimate. For example,
I designated this April 4, 2017, statement by Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio)—which
attacked a Peterson Institute projection regarding the impacts of NAFTA—as criticism:
“The Peterson Institute said we would have jobs, we would have rising incomes, we
would have more benefits for workers. Wrong, wrong, wrong.” Activities were events
taking place with or at these think tanks unrelated to policy. I removed references to the
“Daily Digest,” a daily itinerary of sorts within congressional records that indicates
events that think tanks may be party to, and that excludes congressional deliberations.
After removing these references, the number of records mentioning think tanks fell to
661.
There are a couple limitations to coding criticisms and activities both as zero as I have.
For instance, it is worth considering a critique as anti-support, and therefore it could be
coded as a negative value negating supportive comments to the same think tank or
adding negative value (positive for the opposition party) to others. Moreover, some
representatives simply cite think tanks more frequently than others and it would be
useful to parse out total mentions, regardless of context, in order to ascertain these
members.

Furthermore, the designations were not mutually exclusive; support may mix with
criticism or activity, and in several cases I needed to thoroughly review the context of a
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particular mention to gauge whether it was an instance of criticism and/or support. For
example, the following quote on November 28th, 2018 by Sen. Sanders (I) from Vermont
was coded as support: “In a 2017 report by the conservative Cato Institute, Saudi Arabia,
our ally in this terrible war in Yemen, was ranked 149 out of 159 countries in terms of
freedom and human rights. That is our ally. That is the country with which we are
putting our credibility on the line.” Cato’s report is used, I think, as part of a larger
critique of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, caused in part by the U.S. and its
partnership with an undemocratic monarchy. But in this instance, Sanders uses Cato’s
ranking to support his critique. It is also important to note that each record is different.
Some may be single-page transcripts, while others are as long as 70 pages, with several
legislators making reference to several different think tanks.
Finally, I did not code the occurrences of publicly funded think tanks, Congress’s
support agencies. While it could add depth to my study, my analysis focuses on
nonprofit think tanks; proper comparisons to publicly funded think tanks would be
useful for future research, but my preliminary analysis found that the two groups were
not comparable in a straightforward manner on the metrics I am using here (for
example, the CRS Twitter account is private and used for internal communication). I did
track mentions of the Congressional Research Service; with 104 records (not included in
my sample of 661), it appears less often in the congressional record than the most
frequently referenced private think tank, the Heritage Foundation, which had 128
mentions.
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After coding references to Members of Congress (MOCs), MOC ideology scores were
applied to the referenced think tank, totaled, and averaged by mention. Over 500 coded
references using DW–Nominate scores for the 115th Congress were used to establish
partisanship scores for think tanks.

The results of my partisanship analysis are found in Table 5.1. The scores represent the
average partisanship value of the think tank based on the ideology scores from DWNominate data of who mentions a think tank’s research, reports, and ideas. In other
words, a politician’s political predisposition is used here as a proxy for the political
disposition of the think tank they reference. For example, these findings suggest a report
or article by the National Bureau for Economic Research would not be unlike a speech
from Senator Joe Donnelly of Indiana (D). Likewise, work by the Hoover Institute might
have a similar ideological cast as a speech from Pennsylvania representatives Ryan
Costello (R) or Patrick Meehan (R). Put another way, a speech from Senator Susan
Collins of Maine (R) might be something one would hear at AEI or the RAND
Corporation, and a speech by Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia (D) might be
overheard at Brookings or the Atlantic Council.

Table 5. 1: Think Tank Partisanship Scores
Think Tank
American Enterprise Institute
Atlantic Council
Brookings Institution
Center for American Progress
CATO Institute
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace

Partisanship Score
0.081
-0.054
-0.054
-0.393
-0.237
-0.374
0.111
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Council on Foreign Relations
Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Economic Policy Institute
Freedom House
Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institution
Human Rights Watch
National Bureau of Economic Research
New America
Open Markets Institute
Peterson Institute
RAND Corporation
Urban Institute

-0.154
-0.144
-0.400
0.035
0.170
0.213
-0.228
-0.108
-0.372
-0.172
-0.339
0.087
-0.057

Note: As described in the main text, these data are based on DW-Nominate scores for members of
the 115th Congress (Lewis, et al., 2019), which I applied as a proxy for the partisanship scores of the
think tanks that each member of Congress references. Higher scores correspond to more references
by conservative members of Congress. Human Rights Watch’s partisanship score is included here
even though it is omitted from my SPSS analyses; see the earlier note about its status as an outlier.

In this analysis, a higher partisanship score is associated with a more conservative think
tank. Overall, the range of partisanship among think tanks is narrow (-.4004 to .2133)
compared to that for policymakers (-.76 to .93). This is expected, given that as more
members in both parties, or within the same party, reference a think tank, the averages
will drag partisanship scores to the center. The mean ideology score is -.114, with a
standard deviation of .199; in other words, NBER’s partisanship score of -.108 means
that it is slightly more conservative than the mean (see Figure 5.1). The standardized
view places the average at the mean partisanship score for think tanks.
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Figure 5. 1 Standardized Partisanship Scores
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Some of the scores raised questions, given what is known about specific think tanks. For
example, the Peterson Institute was mentioned only by Democrats, giving it the
appearance in this analysis of one of the most liberal think tanks (recall unsupportive
comments were not coded). The late Pete G. Peterson, who chaired the institute that
carries his name, was the co-founder of the Blackstone Group, a private equity firm, and
former chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations. The institute is known for its
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support of a balanced budget, raising concerns in its research about the consequences of
rising federal debt, such as limited growth and potential cuts to Social Security (The
Nation, 2013). While the Peterson Institute tends to be seen as a vehicle for fiscally
conservative, even Tea Party, proposals, more centrist Democrats like Heidi Heitkamp
invoked its arguments during the 115th Congress: debt and limited growth can be used as
a rationale by either party when attempting to block the policies of a Congress
dominated by its opposition. Take member of the House from Alabama (D), Terri
Sewell’s reaction to Trump’s proposal to implement a 25 percent tariff on automotive
imports: “The Peterson Institute for International Economics predicts that if the new
auto tariffs are implemented, the United States will lose 624,000 jobs and production
would fall by 4 percent. As Members of Congress, we cannot stand by and allow this
administration’s destructive trade policies to hurt American workers.”
Budget, location, and age. The expenditures by the think tanks in my sample over the
two-year period of analysis total $2.35 billion, or about $1.27 billion a year (n = 31); the
budget mean was $78.5 million, with a standard deviation of $123 million. The RAND
Corporation had the largest two-year budget, at over $650 million, and the Center for
Economic Policy Research had the smallest, at $4 million. However, given that there are
a few think tanks with large budgets, the median ($44 million) is a more appropriate
measure of the financial resources of the typical think tank (see Table 5.2 for more
information on think tank finances based on their Form 990s, an annual filing required
by the IRS for nonprofit organizations).
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Out of the 35 think tanks, 26 – about three-quarters – are located within city limits of
Washington, D.C. The average age of a think tank in my sample (n=35) is 44 years,
which would mean an organization was founded in 1975. (If all these ages were summed,
nearly nineteen hundred years of experts helping government think have been
accumulated by my sample.)

Table 5. 2: IRS Form 990 Information for Select Think Tanks
Think Tanks % Change in
Assets
American Enterprise Institute
5.4%
Atlantic Council
43.3%
Brookings Institution
1.8%
Center for American Progress
10.1%
Cato Institute
7.5%
Carnegie Endowment for Intl. Peace
8.5%
Center for Economic and Policy Res.
-44.4%
Council on Foreign Relations
8.1%
Center for a New American Security*
38.9%
CSIS*
5.4%
Foreign Policy Res. Inst.
14.3%
Freedom House*
-13.3%
Heritage Foundation
10.4%
Hudson Institute
20.9%
Human Rights Watch
4.1%
IPS*
32.6%
Manhattan*
1.7%
Mercatus
-1.1%
NCPPR*
9.1%
New America
13.6%
NBER
5.9%
Peterson Institute*
2.8%
RAND*
17.8%
Resources for the Future*
3.1%
Stimson Center
3.4%
Urban Institute
4.5%
WCEG
25.8%
W. Wilson Center*
1.1%
Avg. reported asset change
8.6%
Source: IRS public filings of Form 990s
* 2015-2016 tax forms were used when 2017 was unavailable.

Net Assets
in 2017 (in
millions)
$320.7
$38.4
$474.8
$54.4
$81.4
$331.6
$1.0
$519.6
$10.0
$143.6
$1.6
$3.9
$265.8
$40.5
$213.5
$5.7
$23.7
$18.8
$1.2
$26.8
$123.0
$70.2
$280.9
$60.7
$3.0
$158.0
$3.9
$89.9

Two-Year
Expenditures
(in millions)
$105.8
$51.7
$199.0
$87.2
$60.6
$73.9
$4.0
$143.0
$19.0
$91.2
$4.5
$62.8
$167.0
$28.1
$145.7
$8.1
$36.7
$56.5
$13.5
$73.3
$80.1
$20.9
$666.1
$28.3
$11.0
$179.9
$9.6
$47.7
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Media visibility. Using Newspaper Source Plus, I analyzed references to the think tanks
in my sample during the analysis period from January 2017 to January 2019. The total
number of references to think tanks in print media were 142 in the Washington Post,
181 in the New York Times, and 107 in the Wall Street Journal, with a combined print
total of 431 mentions in print media (this figure does not include online-only articles).
During this same period, the number of appearances by think tanks to give testimony
before the 115th Congress totaled 321. The mean number of congressional testimonies for
a think tank was 9; however, the median was 5, indicating that a few think tanks give
most of the testimonies.

The average monthly number of tweets from a think tank provides a measure of their
social media activity. This number is calculated based on data from the month of a think
tank’s Twitter account creation to the end of the analysis period, March 2020. The
measured activity ranges from 15 tweets per month (Institute for Policy Studies) to 792
tweets per month (Brookings), with an average of 270 tweets per month and a standard
deviation of 191 (n=33).

To gauge more recent social media activity, I separated out a period from April 2018 to
March 2020 to compare the pace of activity as measured by tweets per month (see Table
5.3). Brookings has been consistent in their output, steadily producing about 800 tweets
per month. However, some think tanks have recently accelerated their activity, like the
RAND Corporation and Heritage Foundation. While overall their tweets per month were
445 and 616, respectively, in recent years they have ramped up to about 800 per month.
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The sharpest growth was for the Economic Policy Institute, which had overall Twitter
activity of about 215 tweets per month, but which in the more recent period posted an
average of about 639 tweets per month; EPI output has increased by about 300 percent
in the last two years, compared to its pace of activity since account creation to 2020,
over 11 years ago.
Table 5. 3: Social Media Activity for Select Think Tanks
Think Tank*
AEI
Brookings Institution
CATO
CBPP
CEIP
CFR
CSIS
EPI
Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institution
Mercatus Center
NBER
New America
Open Markets Institute
Peterson Institute
RAND Corporation
Urban Inst

Overall
Tweet/Month Pace
436.6
792.3
534.3
178.5
257.1
418.4
618.5
215.5
616.9
238.4
290.8
100.8
232.7
158.6
184.8
445.5
136.3

2018-2020
Pace
291.3
800.0
608.7
182.6
243.5
460.9
695.7
639.1
808.7
121.7
317.4
104.3
139.1
200.4
265.2
800.0
191.3

* based on overall measures (from account creation) and cross-sectional measures (2018-20)

Other think tanks, like the Hoover Institution and New America, have dramatically
reduced their Twitter output. Whereas these two think tanks now produce 122 and 139
tweets per month, respectively, in my cross-section, their averages from the launches of
their Twitter accounts were 238 and 232 per month, which corresponds to a drop in
social media activity of nearly 50 percent.
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The average think tank has about 117,000 Twitter followers, with a standard deviation of
148,000. The high degree of dispersion in these data is due to the heavy skew toward
think tanks with many followers, such as the Heritage Foundation; most think tanks
have followers in the tens of thousands. Heritage is by far the most followed think tank,
with nearly 660,000 followers in March 2020 – representing nearly 17 percent of all
think tank followers in my sample. The next tier of think tanks in terms of Twitter
followings includes the Brookings Institution, Cato Institute, and CFR, each of which
have over one-third of a million followers, followed by AEI, the Hoover Institution, and
the Atlantic Council, each with just over one hundred thousand followers.

Counting “likes” on tweets by think tanks provides a measure of the effectiveness of
their social media activity. As early as March of 2019, Twitter began testing the removal
of “like” and “retweet” counts from public access, but I had previously gathered data for
this metric in April 2018 from a subsample of think tanks (n = 15). Notably, the range of
likes in this subsample is broad. Brookings and Heritage Foundation had more than
72,000 likes, and the Urban Institute, EPI, and NBER had less than 15,000. However, a
different picture of the “like” data emerges when this metric is averaged across the
number of tweets made (again, up to April 2018). On the popular end, for example, the
Peterson Institute and Urban Institute garnered roughly one “like” for every two tweets,
whereas Heritage Foundation, AEI, EPI, Brookings, and CSIS collected less than one
like for every three tweets. The CFR, “Wall Street’s think tank” (Shoup, 2015), collected
less than one “like” per hundred tweets, which is surprising given that the CFR had
370,000 followers at the time. Across the subsample, the average number of tweets
needed for one “like” was about eight. These data suggest that think tanks are very active
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on Twitter but receive relatively little attention from their thousands of followers or the
broader public.

Correlational analysis
I calculated Pearson correlations (see Table 5.4) to assess the strength and direction of
bivariate relationships. Although Pearson correlations are not PRE (proportional
reduction of error) measures of association, they are easy to understand and paint an
overall picture of potential relationships. R-square is a PRE, and can be used to
approximate how completely one variable accounts for the other, adding depth to the
analysis.

According to the analysis, total print media citations and social media activity (tweets
per month) are significantly correlated to a very large degree (p < 0.001) (Cohen J. ,
1988). In fact, about 49 percent of the variation in total print media citations can be
explained by tweets per month (r-square = 0.491). While media visibility efforts appear
to be aligned, however, these different metrics may provide unique information, and
therefore I have included both of them in my hierarchical regression model.

Think tanks face higher hurdles in getting published or cited in print media than they do
in social media, which can explain their high Twitter activity relative to their print
citations. AEI, for example, was referenced in print media 56 times during the 115th
Congress, while in the cross-section of recent social media activity AEI posted 6,700
tweets, or about 300 posts per month.
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The relationship between think tank partisanship and its visibility in print media is less
straightforward than might be expected. On one hand, the more conservative the think
tank is, the more likely it is to be referenced in the Wall Street Journal (n = 19; r =
0.471; p < 0.05). No such significant relationship existed – either in a liberal or
conservative direction – for the other two papers of record. On the other hand, the most
active Twitter accounts tend to be liberal, once budget is accounted for (via the
tweet/month/$M variable – tweets per month per million dollars in budget); for this
relationship, the Pearson’s r is -0.517 and the r-square is 0.26. (Raw Twitter activity
measures have no statistically significant relationship to partisanship.) In other words,
after controlling for their budgets, the Twitter activity of the think tanks in my sample
explains 26.7% of the variation in their partisanship scores.

In my analysis of variables correlated with appearances before Congress, the most
influential variables overall were found to be tweets per month, followers by age, and
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citations in the Wall Street Journal. Each of these variables was highly significant (p <
0.001), and based on these findings, I incorporated each of them, in this order, within
my hierarchical regression (described below). The high degree of correlation between
the print citations variables—the three measures for individual print outlets (the
Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal) and the combined total—
suggest that they measure a similar phenomenon, though the Wall Street Journal had
the strongest correlation with the congressional testimonies variable. Given its
reputation as a more conservative media outlet relative to the other two newspapers, I
used the Wall Street Journal to predict appearances before Congress during the analysis
period, which featured a more conservative Congress.

The correlational analysis also found that a significant relationship between a think
tank’s two-year budget and its likelihood of appearing before Congress (n =30; r =
0.472; p < 0.01). Not surprisingly, think tanks with more financial resources were more
likely to give congressional testimony; this budget metric was also significantly related,
though slightly less so, to followers and tweets per month. Think-tank age was positively
correlated with followership, total citations, and citations individually in the
Washington Post and New York Times; there appeared to be no relationship between
age and citations in the Wall Street Journal, however. Age is also positively correlated
with conservatism (r = 0.593), which was the strongest relationship that age had to any
of the variables considered here, explaining about 35 percent of the variation in
partisanship scores.
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Predicting appearances before Congress
Based on the strength of their correlations in the earlier analysis, I predicted
appearances before the 115th Congress using the following variables, in this order: tweets
per month (tweet/month), followers by age of Twitter account (followers/account age),
and references in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). I based this ordering within my
hierarchical regression analysis on a theoretical consideration of the process by which
media visibility might lead to congressional testimony. As I discussed earlier, the
additional filter that editors apply to content may slow or even block a think tank’s
ability to easily reach the public and potential donors. Social media – Twitter, in this
case – circumnavigates that barrier to the public. If social media activity precedes print,
then followers could drive the importance of an issue on the media’s agenda. It is not
uncommon to find print articles reporting on issues that have already generated a flurry
of social media attention. While the inverse also occurs – print articles spurring social
media activity – it is clear that print media cannot compete with social media in terms of
output and speed. My analysis builds upon this assumption that social media precedes
print media.

Thus, I use social media activity in the first block, then followers by age of Twitter
account in the second block, and finally citations in the Wall Street Journal in the third
block. The followers by age variable was added to account for the size of a think tank’s
social network. While the variable “followers by age” was minutely weaker than
“followers” overall in strength of relationship to appearing before Congress, the need to
standardized the length of time an account accumulates followers seems to benefit from
face validity. A think tank with half the Twitter account age should be reasonably
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expected to have less followers, and thus standardized. As discussed earlier, I added
citations in the Wall Street Journal given that it is the periodical preferred by
conservatives (in power during the analysis period), and among the four print media
variables, this measure had the strongest observed relationship with congressional
testimonials.

Although there were variables to consider worth including in my hierarchical regression
model, like budget or partisanship, it was the media’s role as conduit to policymakers
that this study means to investigate. By comparison, the other variables lacked the
strength found in media variables, none more than location, to congressional
appearances. Moreover, media’s role as special conduit for think tank expertise has long
been acknowledged by Frederick C. Mosher (1984) with regards to Congress’ own
support agency, the GAO. Adding further variables from print or social media would risk
multicollinearity as well as fail to contribute new information to the model.

Before the analysis was conducted, I dropped one case (Human Rights Watch) because
it was an outlier, as discussed earlier. This reduced the number of cases for this analysis
to 34. The bivariate relationships were mostly linear, with no unexpected signs.

The results of the hierarchical regression are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Part,
partial, and zero-order correlations of each predictor with congressional testimony were
requested alongside tolerance scores and default statistics.
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The overall regression model was statistically significant with all three predictors, R =
0.821, R2 = 0.674, adjusted R2 = 0.641, F(3, 29), p < 0.001. Appearing before Congress
in a hearing could be reasonably predicted using these three variables, explaining about
64 percent of the variance in congressional testimonies accounted for by the regression.

Individual predictors can be assessed using t ratios from individual regression slopes
each time a variable is first added. For example, in Step 1 tweets per month were
statistically significant: t(31) = 5.002, p < .001, and an R2inc = .447. The direction of the
relationship between tweets per month and congressional testimony was as expected.
The positive relationship indicates that more social media activity predicts an increased
likelihood of appearing before Congress. Followers by account age did not significantly
increase R2 when it was entered in Step 2: t(30) = 1.803, p = .091, and an R2inc = .051.
The direction was also as expected. Finally, in Step 3, Wall Street Journal mentions
were statistically significant: t(29) = 3.964, p < .001, and an R2inc = .176. The direction
was positive and expected. Tolerance scores – the amount of change in congressional
testimony not already included by other variables – suggest each variable contributes
new information to the model. Tolerance scores are as follows: tweet per month is
0.341; followers by account age is 0.372; Wall Street Journal is 0.653. In sum,
appearing before Congress is well explained by the set of predictors in my study. The
most potent predictor is citations in Wall Street Journal, in spite of the fact that this
variable was only included in the final step. Only followers by account age failed to
significantly increase R2 in Step 2, when it was entered. Reversing the order of followers
by age of account and Wall Street Journal yielded similar results.
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Table 5. 5: Results of Hierarchical Regression
Results of Hierarchical Regression to Predict Congressional Testimony

TWEET/MONTH
FOLLOWERS/
ACCT AGE
WSJ

Congressional
Testimony
0.668

Tweet/
month

0.666

0.788

0.751

0.579

Followers/Acct
Age

WSJ

0.523

2

b

B

sr

0.008

0.151

0.447***

0.003

0.275

0.051

1.132

0.52

0.176***

incr

Intercept =
1.177
MEAN
SD

9.64

270.323

924.878

3.24

10.807

191.959

1101.824

4.963
2

0.674

2

0.641
0.821***

R =
R adj =
R=

Table 5. 6: Summary of Each Step in Hierarchical Regression
2

2

Summary of R Values and R Changes at Each Step in the Hierarchical Regression
2

R for Model

F for Model

2

R Change

2

F for R Change

1

Tweet/month

0.447

F(1, 31) = 25.03***

0.447

F (1, 31) = 25.03***

2

Tweet/month,
Followers/Acct Age
Tweet/month,
Followers/Acct Age,
WSJ

0.498

F(2, 30) = 14.87***

0.051

F (1, 30) = 3.05

0.674

F(3, 29) = 20.01***

0.176

F (1, 29) = 15.71***

3
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Ch. 6 Predators and Principles
Think tanks are political actors. As I described in this dissertation, they can be seen as
operating on two axes: from principled to predatory, and from rigorous to negligent.
While never a unanimous view (as the conclusions of the Brownlow Committee
emphasized), a once-popular view of think tanks was that they were led by a
dispassionate pursuit of truth, seeking practical solutions to complex social problems.
For certain think tanks, this may still be true, but there are also pressures to risk more
predatory and negligent behaviors in order to attract (and keep) donors or support bias
and prejudice. The think tanks in my study are spending over $1 billion a year, engaging
with members of Congress and interacting heavily with media, activities that raise
questions about where they fall within the principled-predatory and rigorous-negligent
continuums.
Think tanks acting predatorily on behalf of elites
One common contemporary view of think tanks is that they represent the interests and
preferences of elites, and my analysis supports this view. I find that budget is decisive
with regards to appearing before Congress. Moreover, this budget measure does not
include assets or endowments, which may understate the extent of this inequity. Similar
to the financialization of the American economy, think tanks too are increasingly
financialized. Think tank net assets in general are increasing; and some think tanks, like
AEI, Brookings, CFR, CEIP, and the Peterson Institute, have net assets on the order of
four to ten times their yearly expenditures. On one hand, these assets can enable big
think tanks to weather lulls in financial donations, but on the other, it raises questions
regarding their non-profit claims. By comparison, the seven smallest think tanks by
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assets in my sample total $20.3 million, or one-fifteenth that of AEI. Moreover, the big
think tanks have elite connections with board members from the top echelons of
business and finance. The typical think tank saw an average increase in its reported net
assets of nearly nine percent from 2016 to 2017 (as seen in Table 5.2). In short, big
government accepts big think tanks.
These data also fail to account for how think tanks often act—often predatorily—in
concert with wealthy donors, action funds, and 501(c)4s, which may be able to turn on
and off resources as desired. These collaborations are especially prevalent among larger
think tanks, whose revenue and assets are increasing at a faster rate than their
expenditures are. Between 2016 and 2017, for instance, the Atlantic Council’s revenue
increased by 54 percent and its assets by 43 percent, while its expenditures only grew 15
percent.

Their accumulated assets have grown so substantial that the largest think tanks may
have difficulty spending their funds. These dominant think tanks also have a
disproportionate amount of direct communication with Members of Congress,
compared to the smaller think tanks in my sample. The top ten percent of think tanks
invited to give testimony to Congress, Heritage, AEI, and CSIS respectively, amount to
more than a third of all testimonies given from my sample (34.9%).
Of course, think tanks, even at their origin, were political and politicized. Frederick
Mosher’s (1982) milquetoast appraisal of the debate between policy-politics and
administration in the Brownlow Committee belies first-hand accounts of the feud with
Brookings. As conflicting reports from the groups serve to undercut one another, Louis
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Brownlow was alarmed “the reputation of government research… for scientific
impartiality is at stake” (Roberts, 1995). At the time, the Rockefeller Foundation
attempted to mediate a political battle among these two in secret, whose conflict served
to undercut a growing federal bureaucracy from a public likely unwilling to accept.
Today, the belief that think tanks provide impartial expertise may serve to mask even
more predatory and partisan exercise of power. Ignoring this political dimension only
invites more predatory and negligent actors into the arena.

Furthermore, big think tanks tend to work closely with big business and big donors,
which raises questions about whether they should still be given the de facto public
subsidy of tax-exempt status. The president of New America is congenial to these close
relationships with donors, stating “these are not just black boxes; they’re people. Google
is a person… particularly when they give you money, which is really a nice thing” (Cohen
R. M., 2018). Others, like social media giant, Facebook, partnered a relationship with
the Atlantic Council, Taiwan donates consistently to AEI, and Saudi Arabia made
contact with dozens of think tanks in the wake of the Jamal Khashoggi murder. This
may speak to a growing tolerance in American politics for large-scale institutional
power, foreign and domestic. While President Theodore Roosevelt’s new nationalism
decried corporate power, by mid-century orthodox economists described monopoly
positively and argued that great size did not necessarily hinder the efficient workings of
markets. In a similar fashion, there appears to be little outcry regarding the dominance
of the major think tanks within the ideological market. Among the nearly two thousand
think tanks in the U.S., a relatively few elite think tanks receive much of the media and
congressional attention.
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Think tanks shift to the left and face pressures to adapt
My analysis of think tank partisanship finds that older think tanks that were once seen
as conservative—for instance, the Brookings Institution—have realigned as centrist or
leftist relative to Members of Congress (MOC), who have overall become more
conservative (Hacker & Pierson, 2016). To some extent, these political shifts within
Congress have drawn establishment think tanks closer to the Democratic Party. In
general, more Democrats cited think tanks than Republicans.

If Congress has moved farther to the right in the 115th Congress and think tanks now
find themselves ideologically more to the left, relatively speaking, then does that place
pressure on them to adapt to the politics of their customers in Congress, or are they
presaging a political shift of elites? And in doing so, would such posturing be
symptomatic of or encourage more predatory and negligent behaviors? It is conceivable
that an unprecedented shift of elites is underway.11 In such cases, think tanks competing
for dollars may signal shifting elite preferences as a way forward.

There are some nuances in these aggregate trends, however. Consider the Cato
Institute—historically viewed as a far-right think tank—which was found in my analysis
to attract more supportive references from MOCs on the left than those on the right. For
example, on Nov. 6, 2017, Democratic Senator Dick Durbin cited the Cato Institute for a
report on DACA that discussed the economic costs of President Trump’s September
11

According to Piketty (2020), for the first time since 1948, in the 2016 presidential election the top 10%
income earners voted Democrat more than the bottom 90% income earners did. The wealthiest 10% of
voters show a shrinking majority preference for Republicans, compared to the bottom 90%.
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2017 decision to end DACA; Democratic Senator John Reed echoed Senator Durbin’s
concerns about DACA’s fiscal impacts. These references and others outweighed the
positive references by conservatives, but it is unclear from this cross-sectional analysis if
Democrats have moved toward Cato, or if the administration that Democrats are
criticizing has moved to the right of Cato.

In other words, the surprising skew of the think tank partisanship scores I calculated
could be products of the aberrant nature of the current administration, and/or a
political realignment of the two major parties. Another limitation of my analysis is the
unique political climate and makeup of the 115th Congress, the basis of my empirical
analysis. During this Congress, Trump benefited from a Republican-held Congress,
which may have made the minority party eager to pull their political rivals back to the
center by highlighting conservative policy alternatives amenable to the Democratic
Party. A singular dimension would struggle to show how realigning parties actually are,
however. Imagine ideologues from both poles of the spectrum forming new coalitions,
they may appear as more centrists on a single dimension but do not hold the support of
other traditional centrists. And Trump’s presidency has the hallmarks of a party
realigning (Greenberg S. , 2019). If a party realignment is occurring, we might expect to
see the existing landscape of think tanks adjusting to the new political realities.
Social media activity and mentions in more conservative media associated
with appearing before Congress
My study has similar findings to Rich (2001) nearly two decades ago. I find that a think
tank’s number of mentions in the Wall Street Journal is positively correlated with a
think tank’s measured degree of conservatism, and that the Washington Post cites more
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think tanks than the Wall Street Journal does. However, an interesting point to note is
that while the ages of think tanks were positively correlated with their degree of
conservatism, that age variable and my measure of Wall Street Journal citations were
not significantly related. Simply put, the Wall Street Journal does not cite older think
tanks more often than newer ones, or vice versa.

Appearing in the Wall Street Journal—considered to be the more conservative of the
three national newspapers of record—is highly correlated with giving congressional
testimony in the 115th Congress. New research is beginning to test causal mechanisms of
this phenomena. One recent study of British politics (Sevenans, 2017) suggests how
such a relationship between media citations and political impact might operate, in that
certain information in the media frames the agenda, leading to politician action. If the
media influences Members of Congress in the same way that it does Members of
Parliament, then think-tank appearances in the media could be decisive in determining
whether their prescribed policies are adopted by policymakers.
Social media differs fundamentally from traditional print media in that it allows
communication to the public largely unimpeded by traditional gatekeepers. At the same
time, it imposes algorithmic incentives that favor content likely to hold the attention of
audiences to a greater degree, arguably, than was the case for the news judgment of
editors (Zuboff, 2019). The new media terrain offers a clear, unmistakable risk to more
negligent expert behavior. Circumnavigating major editors allows think tanks to engage
with the topic du jour, increasing the risk that they will disseminate negligent research—
say, by tweeting (or retweeting) about unvetted studies in order to participate in quickly
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changing news cycles. Though their activity in this space is far from uniform, my
measures of think tank tweets per month on social media strongly correlated with their
citations in traditional print media as well, suggesting that the media landscape—new
and old—is winner-take-all.

A hierarchical regression reasonably predicts the likelihood of appearing before
Congress based on just three publicly available variables: tweets per month, followers by
age of Twitter account, and citations in the Wall Street Journal. It should be noted that
on one hand, the tweets per month variable is related to think tank success in appearing
before Congress. Generally speaking, the more active think tanks are likely to appear
before Congress. On the other hand, when controlling for the size of the think tank’s
budget, there was no relationship to congressional testimonies. Yet, all the same, the
more active the think tank is on Twitter controlling for budget, the more liberal it is.

Even the largest think tanks do not attract audiences on the scale that popular national
politicians do. For instance, President Trump has over 70 million followers, but think
tanks have numbers more in the range of state governors, like Virginia’s Ralph Northam
(with over 190,000 followers) or Texas’s Greg Abbott (with over 240,000). Recall that
Twitter is used by individual think tank scholars as well, some of whom can reach
audiences much greater in size than my think tank sample’s mean of 117,000: for
example, former Brookings president and current president of CFR Richard Haass has
over 170,000 followers, and Norman Ornstein of AEI has over 130,000.

146

The pressures that think tanks face within the media may interact with the inequalities I
described earlier. For instance, I found that think tanks with large budgets are most
effective at reaching Congress, but it is also true that such elite think tanks have the
resources to put on large social media campaigns and engage with media outlets.
Likewise, if the rise of social media and a quickening news cycle incentivizes swift but
negligent behavior on the part of think tanks, more partisan and predatory think tanks
funded by ideological or corporate donors—such as International Life Sciences
Institute—may be best equipped to thrive in such a space.

Limitations and implications for future research and policies
Beyond the limitations discussed above, it is important to note that my measure of
political influence is based on appearances before Congress. Furthermore, my use of this
measure assumes that appearing before Congress is a valuable objective for many think
tanks. Frankly, it may not be for the more predatory and more negligent think tanks in
the community, which may seek to dissemble confidence and promote doubt among the
public.
Further research could account for popular think tanks in Congress that are not in my
study, nor heavily referenced in the media or in McGann’s index of top think tanks.
Moreover, ordinal variables for support, criticism, and activity may alleviate some of the
perplexity where distinctions are not overt and clear. Also, there is a gap in the research
as to how and how much these groups assist departments and agencies across all levels
of government. Lastly, what and how think tanks (publicly funded and non-profit) are
most utilized by state legistlatures? With hundreds of think tanks, and some networks
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like the State Policy Network or international Atlas Network, much of the thinking about
what government should do is by unofficial, publicly subsidized policy actors.

This research also speaks to the need for new policies to rein in predatory and negligent
behaviors by think tanks. The race for cash led to a neglect of their primary purpose,
which is to supply unbiased, rigorous information. Instead, there is an elite among the
elite, that monopolize and narrow the marketplace of ideas, increasing the risk of
capture and influence from fewer owners. One ambitious solution proposed by Julia
Cagé (2020) would reshape the larger partisan organizational ecosystem that includes
think tanks but also political parties and special-interest groups. Building from her
suggestion and others like Lawrence Lessig, representatives could create a new financial
instrument—I’ll suggest “political power points” or “democracy dollars”—which could be
given to every adult (equivalent to three or four hours pay at minimum wage, perhaps,
and could be distributed via decentralized cryptocurrency). Citizens could then allocate
these points to political parties or ideological movements (which think tanks could
become members of). This could be funded, in part, by taxes on donations to political
groups and charities, and more importantly, hasten the formation of new political
movements. This view suggests that these groups are little more than publicly-subsizied
vehicles – tanks – for the cultural preferences of the donor-class, void of incentives
attendant to the broader public.

More modest approaches include changes to tax policies relevant to nonprofits, which
currently enable partisan think tanks to operate with public subsidy, or transparency
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laws. Tax law should find ways to distinguish between think tanks focused on objective
research and those with more partisan or ideological aims; it should give tax-exempt,
tax-deductible status only to the former group. It is plausible to imagine staggered levels
of tax-status eligibility, based on the proximity of major donors to the decision-making,
the degree of transparency to the public regarding the organization’s activities and
funding provided, profitability and perpetuity of charters, and the degree of involvement
that ordinary citizens can exert over the governance of nonprofit entities, including
public citizen representation on the boards of these organizations. Transparency could
be required in order to receive tax-exempt status, for example. These classifications
could be another useful measure for public citizens and policymakers to consider when
they donate to such organizations or consume their reports.

Indeed, if think tanks adopt a more transparent approach to their funding model and
address democratic deficits through shared governance, they can be a force for
revitalizing American democracy. If Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) have lost faith in
congressional compromise, think tanks—given their relatively more moderate
ideological positions—can play a constructive role in overcoming partisan gridlock.
Bonica (2015) argues that if provided easily digestible informational cues, voters could
more closely approximate the representative that aligns with their political disposition;
laboratory studies suggest this would work (Sniderman & Stiglitz, 2012). In this area in
particular, think tanks have the capability to enhance the informational context in which
the public and policymakers make decisions.
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